Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions by Smith, Steven D.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 4 Article 1
4-20-2011
Constitutional Divide: The Transformative
Significance of the School Prayer Decisions
Steven D. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven D. Smith Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 4 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol38/iss4/1
Constitutional Divide: The
Transformative Significance of the
School Prayer Decisions
Steven D. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. CONTINGENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
A. The Conclusion: Engel
B. The Explanation: Schempp
C. Unanswered Questions
III. A CRAZY-QUILT, QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
A. The Perennial Contenders
B. Incompatible but (Sometimes) Indistinguishable
C. Patterns ofDominance?
D. The Conceptions as Quasi-Constitutional
E. The Virtues of Quasi-Constitutionalism
1. Quasi-Constitutionalism as the Default Position
2. The Positive Advantages of Quasi-Constitutionalism
F. On the Eve of the School Prayer Decisions
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS
A. How the Decisions Transformed Constitutional Doctrine
1. Secularism as the Doctrinal "Test"
2. The Significance of the Public Schools
3. The Importance of Prayer
B. Why the Significance of the School Prayer Decisions Went
Largely Unnoticed (by Their Supporters)
V. TRANSFORMATIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCHOOL
PRAYER DECISIONS
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
1. Subverting Everson
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry Alexander,
Hugh Cawthome, Chris Eberle, Rick Garnett, Abner Greene, Andy Koppelman, Jessica Lowe,
Wayne McCormack, David McGowan, Mike Newdow, Michael Perry, and George Wright for
helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also benefitted from the commentary of participants in the
Annual Law and Religion Roundtable and in a workshop at the University of Utah.
945
2. The Emergence of the "No Endorsement" Doctrine
B. Constitutional Law Outside the Establishment Clause
C. Divided Discourse
1. The Historical Divide
2. The Cultural Divide
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IRONIES OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Everson v. Board of Education' was the visionary (or perhaps
foolhardy) granddaddy of modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence; the
school prayer decisions-Engel v. Vitale2 and Abington School District v.
Schempp 3 -were among that decision's dutiful descendants. Everson
founded the modem enterprise; Engel and Schempp inherited Everson's
legacy and faithfully maintained and built the family business. To change
the metaphor, Everson was the primary proof; the decisions invalidating
prayer in the public schools were among the virtually irresistible corollaries.
Or at least so goes a standard understanding of modem Establishment
jurisprudence.4 Everson is, as Douglas Laycock declares, "[t]he most
important establishment clause case." 5 As a natural result, in professional
constitutional discourse (as distinguished from politics and popular culture),
Everson has been the more examined, and also embattled, decision.6 By
contrast, though promptly and enduringly unpopular with the general
public,7 the school prayer decisions have from the beginning generally
1. 330 U.S. 1(1947).
2. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
4. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 287 (2001) (asserting that "Everson began the modem edifice of separation
of church and state" and that "[flor half a century, the Supreme Court followed Everson's lead").
5. 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, in RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY 272,288 (2010).
6. See, e.g., EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS (Jo
Rende Formicola & Hubert Morken eds., 1997).
7. Writing at the time, Philip Kurland observed that "[t]he immediate reaction to Engel was
violent and gross." Philip B. Kurland, The School Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE 142, 142 (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963). Bruce Dierenfield reports that Engel provoked "the
greatest outcry against a U.S. Supreme Court decision in a century." BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE
BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: HOW ENGEL v. VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 72 (2007). At an
annual Conference of State Governors, every governor except New York's Nelson Rockefeller
condemned Engel and urged passage of a constitutional amendment to overturn it. Id at 146; see
also ROBERT S. ALLEY, WITHOUT A PRAYER: RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 28, 230
(1996) (recalling that the school-prayer decisions "sent shock waves through large portions of the
citizenry" and "caused an enormous uproar against the Supreme Court"); JULIA C. LOREN, ENGEL V.
VITALE: PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7, 61 (2001) (observing that "[t]he public outcry against
the Court's ruling was swift and loud" and that "newspaper editorials across the country denounced
the ruling"). Lucas Powe notes that "Engel produced more mail to the Court than any previous case
946
[Vol. 38: 945, 2011] Constitutional Divide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
enjoyed a virtual consensus of confident support among constitutional
scholars and cultural elites.8  If Everson with its approval of the "wall of
separation" was correct-and this is of course a contested if-then the
school prayer decisions were pretty much inevitable.9
So it is commonly supposed. In this article, however, I will argue that
these common assessments are mistaken. Controversial though it has been,
Everson was in an important sense an expression of one deeply-rooted
(albeit contested) but relatively concrete and confined American political
tradition-the tradition, which Everson affirmed but distinguished, of
denying public financial assistance to churches or to "sectarian" schools.
The school prayer decisions, by contrast, were a constitutional turning point,
working to transform not only the jurisprudence of religious freedom but
constitutional discourse generally, and indeed the American self-
understanding. Far from being an automatic corollary of Everson, the school
prayer decisions quietly subverted and fundamentally redirected Everson's
teachings. Without denying the significance of Everson, therefore, I will
suggest that the school prayer decisions were the more momentous of the
cases.
If the outcome of the cases today seems foreordained (to legal
observers, at least) and not especially transformative, that fact is in part a
manifestation of the decisions' success in reshaping constitutional
understandings in their own image. By helping to establish a larger
(and few write to say what a good job the justices are doing)." LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008, at 260 (2009). This opposition, though perhaps less
strident today, has not disappeared; thus Kent Greenawalt reports that "[a) large segment of the
American population persists in condemning the Supreme Court for taking religion out of schools
and thus contributing to a secular, immoral, materialist cultural ethos." KENT GREENAWALT, DOES
GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 9 (2005); see also Mary C. Segers, The Religious Equality
Amendment and Voluntary School Prayer, in EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND
LAW AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 6, at 192-98.
8. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 322 ("The broad consensus of elite opinion on this issue
... was demonstrated when Leo Pfeffer, counsel for the American Jewish Congress, rounded up 110
law school deans and professors of law and political science to sign a letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee supporting Engel and opposing school-prayer amendments on the ground that such
observances in public schools would endanger 'the institutions which have preserved religious and
political freedom in the United States."'). Not all leaders supported the decision, however; Erwin
Griswold, Harvard Law School Dean and later Solicitor General under Presidents Johnson and
Nixon, was critical. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 136.
9. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 326-27; cf GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at 39 ("To
understand why the decisions about prayer and Bible reading were so one-sided, we look to the
Everson case."); William Bentley Ball, Litigating Everson After Everson, in EVERSON REVISITED:
RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 6, at 222 (describing Schempp
as "complementary to Everson"). Mary Segers reports that "[t]he connection between the 1947
Everson decision and the Court's school prayer prohibitions in Engel and Schempp is clear and well
acknowledged by scholars of Supreme Court jurisprudence." Segers, supra note 7, at 193.
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constitutional framework within which they themselves appear virtually
inevitable, the decisions have been in a sense self-validating.
And yet this assessment cannot be the whole story because the
momentous quality of the decisions also seems to have been largely invisible
even to those who rendered those decisions. Although the general public
immediately perceived the school prayer decisions as radical,o the Justices
themselves seem for the most part to have been unaware of doing anything
especially audacious." The transformative significance of their
pronouncements is discernible, it seems, only from a distance-not so much
from a geographical or chronological distance as from a cultural and
perspectival distance which allows us to perceive in the cases what a
renowned First Amendment scholar described as "the unnoted change in the
meaning of familiar words and the consequent transformation of controlling
concepts."' 2
Exerting ourselves to notice such developments, we can see how the
cases erected and reflected (in some mixture of unknowable proportions) a
sort of constitutional divide-a divide in both a chronological and a cultural
sense. The decisions subtly worked to sever the American self-conception
that ensued from the understanding that had prevailed historically. But this
separation occurred quietly and mainly among cultural elites, as the
decisions made explicit and official assumptions that had long been taken for
granted by many within those elites. In this somewhat oblique way, the
decisions created, or at least formalized and reinforced, a split-one that has
become if anything even more conspicuous with the passage of years-
within the American self-understanding as it subsisted, at one level, in elite
and professional culture and, at another, in the American culture generally.
From a distance we can observe the beginnings of this divide, and we can
also see how and why the cases' larger significance was, and remains, more
visible from outside professional constitutional discourse than within it.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the school prayer decisions,
explaining how the decisions were contingent in a way that is easy to
overlook today, and noting the questions that the decisions left
unanswered.13 Part III steps back to describe the legal and cultural backdrop
against which the cases were decided, and which they helped to transform.14
More specifically, this section argues that the nation's history had been
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
I1. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 132 (observing that "[i]n a rare moment of political tone-
deafness, [Chief Justice Earl] Warren did not anticipate the fallout from the [Engel] case"). Justice
Brennan insisted that the rulings were not radical or novel, but rather "accord[] with history and
faithfully reflect[] the understanding of the Founding Fathers." Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
12. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 154 (1965).
13. See supra notes 17-125 and accompanying text.
14. See supra notes 126-280 and accompanying text.
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characterized by an ongoing competition, sometimes collaborative and
sometimes more contentious, between providentialist and secularist
conceptions of America. This competition was conducted on a "quasi-
constitutional" level: both the providentialist and the secularist conceptions
claimed, with some support, to be interpretations of how America was
constituted, but neither was understood to be a binding and official
orthodoxy formally mandated by the Constitution. Part IV explains how,
unlike Everson, the school prayer decisions transformed the preexisting
pattern and understanding." They did this not by inventing the secular
conception, which had been around in some form since the Republic's
beginnings, but rather by canonizing it as constitutional orthodoxy, thereby
relegating the competing conception to the status of a constitutional heresy.
This change was subtle and thus easy to overlook (at least by those for
whom the secularist conception was already close to axiomatic), but it was
also immensely important-and disruptive, as the vehement public
opposition which was provoked by the decisions foreshadowed. Some of
the change's implications and consequences, not only for Establishment
Clause issues but also for constitutional law and national self-understanding
more generally, are explored in Part V.16
II. CONTINGENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
In retrospect, the outcome of the school prayer decisions may seem to
have been predetermined. By the 1960s, after all, the nation had become
home to people of a sprawling diversity of religious faiths, or of none. Some
citizens pray in one way, some in another, some not at all." In addition, the
Supreme Court had more than once pronounced the nation's commitment to
"a wall of separation between church and State."18 Given these realities, for
public schools to begin each school day with the recitation of a prescribed
prayer was plainly unacceptable. Wasn't it?"
15. See supra notes 282-315 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 316-424 and accompanying text.
17. See 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About
the Establishment Clause, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 617,
644 (describing "[t]hose who would not pray at all, those who would pray only in private, those who
would pray only after ritual purification, those who would pray only to Jesus, or Mary, or some other
intermediary, those who would pray in Hebrew, or Arabic, or some other sacred tongue").
18. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145,164 (1878)).
19. Bruce Dierenfield observes that "[t]he Warren Court had little choice but to side with the
petitioners in Engel. Given the ever-growing religious pluralism in U.S. society, the Court simply
accommodated constitutional law to reality." DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 133; cf 1 DOUGLAS
949
If the outcome of the cases was foreordained, however, that fact was not
generally apparent on the eve of the decisions. The Court's rulings came as
a shock to the nation,2 0 and as something of a surprise even to many of the
participants in the litigation. 21 The revelation came in two stages and, in a
sense, in reverse order. The first case, Engel v. Vitale, presented the Court's
conclusion-namely, that school prayer was unconstitutional. The second
case, Abington School District v. Schempp, attempted to provide the
innocently portentous premise for that conclusion.
A. The Conclusion: Engel
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country."22
This exquisitely minimalist prayer, the product of lengthy deliberations by a
group of ministers, priests, and rabbis, was unanimously approved by the
New York Board of Regents and enthusiastically endorsed for use in schools
by the New York Association of Secondary School Principals, the Directors
of New York School Boards Association, and the New York Association of
Judges of Children's Courts. 23 In fact, only a minority of schools-by one
estimate only about ten percent 24-actually used the so-called Regents'
Prayer. New York City schools, for example, opted not to use the prayer.25
But when a nearby school district in Nassau County adopted a policy of
having teachers begin each day with a recitation of the Regents' Prayer, the
American Civil Liberties Union promptly filed suit in a New York state
court on behalf of a group of objecting parents and students.26
The lawsuit was instituted against the advice of Leo Pfeffer, the most
learned and active separationist litigator-scholar of his time (and, arguably,
ever).2 ' Like the plaintiffs, Pfeffer was devoutly opposed to school prayer.
LAYCOCK, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, in, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY,
supra note 5, at 225, 254 ("When the Court began to take religious minorities seriously after World
War II, majoritarian religious ceremonies at public events, and especially in public schools, looked
less and less tolerable.").
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. Nassau County schoolteachers were "shocked" by the decision, and the school district's
attorney, Bertram Daiker, was likewise "completely shocked." William Butler, attorney for the
plaintiffs, had expected to win the case, but only by one vote, not by a nearly unanimous decision.
DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 133-34.
22. Id. at 67.
23. Id. at 67-68.
24. LOREN, supra note 7, at 25. Other sources estimated seventeen percent. DIERENFIELD, supra
note 7, at 71.
25. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 70.
26. See id. at 72.
27. Among Pfeffer's numerous scholarly works were GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1974); THE LIBERTIES OF AN AMERICAN (1957) and (with Anson Phelps) the multi-volume
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES.
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But he feared that if the case were to go to the Supreme Court, the prayer
would probably be upheld, and a damaging precedent would be
established.
Pffeffer's pessimism was well-founded. For one thing, the timing
seemed inauspicious: the case was filed during the era of "piety on the
Potomac"-the period in which President Dwight D. Eisenhower held
regular prayer breakfasts and Congress added the words "under God" to the
Pledge of Allegiance. 29 And the piety extended beyond the capital. In his
classic study Protestant-Catholic-Jew, the sociologist Will Herberg reported
that "there has in recent years been an upswing of religion in the United
States [that] can hardly be doubted."30  This "reversal of trend," Herberg
observed, was evident in "the new intellectual prestige of religion on all
levels of cultural life." 3'
But of course public prayer did not begin in the Eisenhower
Administration. It had a long and pervasive history in this country, going
back to the legislative prayers inaugurated in Congress at the same time the
First Amendment was being drafted and enacted, and performed ever since
in legislatures both state and federal.32 Nor was it only the legislative
branch that had conducted prayers; prayer was a uniform feature of
Presidential inauguration ceremonies, and the Court's own sessions began
with a brief invocation-"God Save the United States and this Honorable
Court." 33 Given this history, how could a court determine that government-
sponsored prayer violated the Constitution?
28. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 105.
29. For a good, if somewhat disdainful, contemporary account, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, PIETY
ALONG THE POTOMAC: NOTES ON POLITICS AND MORALS IN THE '50s, at 41 (1964) (report dated
August 17, 1954):
The manifestations of religion in Washington have become pretty thick. We have had
opening prayers, Bible breakfasts, special church services, prayer groups, a "Back to
God" crusade, and campaign speeches on "spiritual values"; now we have added a
postage stamp, a proposed Constitutional amendment, and a change in the Pledge of
Allegiance. The Pledge, which has served well enough in times more pious than ours,
has now had its rhythm upset but its anti-Communist spirituality improved by the
insertion of the phrase "under God." The Postmaster General has held a dedication
ceremony, at which the President and the Secretary of State explained about spiritual
values and such, to launch a new red, white, and blue eight-cent postage stamp bearing
the motto "In God We Trust." A bill has been introduced directing the post office to
cancel mail with the slogan "Pray for Peace."
30. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
SOCIOLOGY 56 (Anchor Books 1960) (1955).
31. Id. at 53.
32. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
33. For a review of the tradition, see id. at 786-90.
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To be sure, the school setting was distinctive. A daily prayer imposed
on impressionable and vulnerable schoolchildren may seem far more
problematic than a similar exercise performed in front of, say, legislators or
adult litigants. But in the Nassau County school district, the prayer was, in
principle, voluntary: students who did not want to participate in the prayer
were allowed to remain silent or leave the classroom. Given social and
psychological pressures, of course, this opt-out option might be difficult as a
practical matter for children to exercise. Christopher Eisgruber and
Lawrence Sager point out that "[s]tudents who visibly abstain from public
prayer rituals may find themselves shunned, teased, or even assaulted by
students in the mainstream."" Still, an opt-out was precisely the remedy
that the Supreme Court had approved in the celebrated case of West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette. Jehovah's Witnesses could not be
compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, the Court had ruled. 7 But as
long as dissenters were permitted to refrain, schoolteachers were free to lead
unobjecting students in the customary "voluntary and spontaneous" (as the
Court sanguinely described it)3 recitation of the Pledge. A similar
conclusion might be anticipated in Engel. Indeed, a post-Everson Supreme
Court decision rejecting a challenge to Bible reading in a public school
provided support-albeit ambiguous support-for such a prediction.39
Nor had more recent decisions from the Supreme Court given the
challengers much to work with. In Everson, to be sure, the Court had
eloquently affirmed a constitutional commitment to the "wall of separation
between church and state." 40 But the case had in fact upheld a New Jersey
program for subsidizing the transportation of students to schools, including
religious schools. The next year, in McCollum v Board of Education,41 the
Court invalidated a "release time" program in which students could elect to
receive religious instruction in public schools.42 A few years later, though,
34. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 70.
35. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 162 (2007). But cf I DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5,
at 531, 573 (asserting that "legislative prayer is equally coercive" as school prayer).
36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
37. Id. at 643.
38. Id at 641.
39. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 432 (1952), the Court had dismissed on
standing grounds a challenge to a state practice of reading the Bible in public schools, noting among
other things that "there was a pretrial stipulation that any student, at his own or his parents' request,
could be excused during Bible reading and that in this case no such excuse was asked." However,
the significance of this fact was uncertain because it was only one among several reasons given by
the Court for its denial of standing.
40. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878)).
41. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
42. Id. at 333.
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in what many viewed as a retreat from McCollum, 43 the Court in Zorach v.
Clauson had approved an off-premises release-time program.44 Treating the
permissibility of public prayer as a solid premise from which to reason,45 the
Court had famously declared: "We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being."46 Zorach was the Court's last word on the
subject; for almost a decade the Court had refrained from taking cases
involving religion in the schools. Indeed, the Court had stayed out of the
Establishment Clause area altogether.47
Despite Pfeffer's objection,48 in early 1959 the plaintiffs filed their
lawsuit, but the decisions in the New York courts seemed to vindicate
Pfeffer's warning. The case was initially tried before Justice Bernard S.
Meyer, a new Democratic appointee to the bench who would later serve on
New York's highest court.49 Meyer was a model of the conscientious judge.
After hearing evidence and argument, he drafted a twenty-page opinion
declaring the prayer exercise unconstitutional. Before issuing his decision,
however, he decided to devote six months of intensive study to the issue-
and then reached the opposite conclusion.so
Meyer's opinion51 was far and away the most learned and meticulous
judicial opinion of the ten that the case would produce; citing and analyzing
43. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the
McCollum case has passed like a storm in a teacup. The wall which the Court was professing to
erect between Church and State has become even more warped and twisted than I expected.").
Philip Kurland opined that Zorach was a "surrender to the political power of the churches."
Kurland, supra note 7, at 172. Such a surrender, however, hardly seems characteristic of Justice
Douglas, author of the majority opinion.
44. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315.
45. Among the markers of our constitutional tradition which the Court invoked as points from
which to reason were "[p]rayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages
of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; [and] 'so help me
God' in our courtroom oaths." Id at 312-13.
46. Id. at 313. Douglas later sought to explain away the statement as a mere acknowledgment
that Puritanism had "helped shape our constitutional law and our common law." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47. While the case was working its way through the lower courts, however, the Supreme Court
decided McGowan, upholding a state Sunday closing law against an Establishment Clause challenge.
And in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court ruled that a religious test for holding
public office violated the Establishment Clause.
48. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Pfeffer submitted amicus briefs on behalf of
various Jewish organizations. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 122.
49. In another controversy that gained national attention, Meyer would also serve as a special
deputy attorney general to investigate the Attica prison riots. Margalit Fox, Bernard S. Meyer is
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.nytimes.con/2005/09/08/nyregion/08meyer.html.
50. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 115-16.
51. Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659 (NY Sup. Ct. Special Term 1959), af'd, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183
(App. Div. 1960), af'd, 176 N.E.2d 579 (N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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numerous judicial and academic sources, it read almost like a well-
researched law review article.12 Meyer was hardly sympathetic to the prayer
exercise (as his initial draft opinion declaring it invalid would suggest). He
sharply rejected a number of arguments made by the school district,53 and he
insisted that the district do more than it had previously done to ensure that
parents and students would have a full opportunity to opt out of the prayer if
they so chose, without any contrary influence or constraints imposed by the
school. 4 However, after a thorough review of how the Establishment
Clause had been understood both at the time of its enactment and also
(anticipating arguments by scholars like Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash)" at the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and after a painstaking
examination of the relevant case law, both state and federal, Meyer
concluded that the prayer exercise was well within a constitutional tradition
that was deeply entrenched and that the Supreme Court had at least
indirectly approved.
This judgment was appealed, and appealed again, and appealed yet
again, but none of the judges who wrote opinions in the case devoted to it
anything like the same care that Justice Meyer had demonstrated. The five-
judge Appellate Division issued a brief, per curiam affirmance, which
simply said, "We agree with the views expressed in the opinion of the
learned Justice at Special Term." 56 Judge George Beldock wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment on the understanding that the prayer
exercise was not compulsory and did not constitute religious instruction; it
"does nothing more than acknowledge the existence of God and dependence
upon him.""
New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, affirmed in a 5-2
decision. None of the four opinions was lengthy. Very much in the spirit of
Zorach, Chief Judge Charles Desmond's opinion noted the pervasiveness of
official acknowledgments of deity and concluded:
52. Though disagreeing with Meyer's analysis and conclusion, Philip Kurland described Meyer's
opinion as "exhaustive and erudite." Kurland, supra note 7, at 149.
53. For example, Justice Meyer rejected the district's procedural and standing arguments, Engel,
18 Misc. 2d at 663-67; he summarily rejected the district's arguments based on a rise in juvenile
crime, id. at 669; and he denied the relevance of the institution of congressional chaplains with the
observation that no citizen would have standing to challenge the institution. Id
54. Id at 694-97.
55. Amar and Lash have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment effectively altered the meaning
of the Establishment Clause. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 246-57 (1998); Kurt T.
Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995).
56. Engel v. Vitale, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (App. Div. 1960), af'd, 176 N.E.2d 579 (N.Y. 1961),
rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
57. Id. at 343 (Beldock, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Beldock's dissenting portion
disagreed with some of Justice Meyer's specific suggestions for ensuring that the prayer exercise
was voluntary.
954
[Vol. 38: 945, 2011] Constitutional Divide
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
That the First Amendment was ever intended to forbid as an
"establishment of religion" a simple declaration of belief in God is
so contrary to history as to be impossible of acceptance. No
historical fact is so easy to prove by literally countless illustrations
as the fact that belief and trust in a Supreme Being was from the
beginning and has been continuously part of the very essence of the
American plan of government and society.58
Judges Charles Froessel and Adrian Burke wrote concurring opinions.
Judge Marvin Dye, while agreeing that the prayer exercise was completely
voluntary, 59 interpreted Everson as requiring "a complete and unequivocal
separation of church and State," and this meant, he thought, that "[t]he
inculcation of religions is a matter for the family and the church," not the
schools.o Judge Stanley Fuld joined in Dye's dissent. Judge Burke
responded that Dye's position "would force on the children a culture that is
founded upon secularist dogma" and would support "the consequent
promotion and advancement of atheism." 62
By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, eleven
of the thirteen judges considering the issue had concluded that the prayer
exercise was constitutional, as had six of the seven judicial opinions
produced by the case to that point. The Supreme Court was as emphatically
of the opposite view, ruling in a 6-1 decision (which would almost certainly
have been 8-1 if Justices Frankfurter and White had voted)63 that the prayer
was unconstitutional." To contemporary sensibilities, at least, that outcome
hardly seems extraordinary: indeed, the decision may seem over-determined.
The legal imagination can readily devise rationales sounding in
psychological coercion and appealing to doctrines and decisions under the
Establishment, 5 Free Exercise,66 and Free Speech Clauses. But the Court
58. Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
59. See id. at 584 (Dye, J., dissenting) (observing that "no penalty attaches for nonnparticipation,
since the board announced that, as a matter of policy, no child was to be required or encouraged to
join in said prayer against his or her wishes").
60. See id. at 585, 588.
6 1. Id.
62. Id. at 583 (Burke, J., concurring).
63. Frankfurter had been crippled with a paralyzing stroke; White was recently appointed and did
not participate in the case. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 129. But Frankfurter was a strong
proponent of secular schools-he had dissented in Zorach-and a year later, White voted with the
majority in Schempp.
64. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
65. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (declaring prayer at middle school graduation
exercise unconstitutional, in part because of psychological coercion imposed on students); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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in Engel did not articulate such rationales; in fact, the Court provided no
very deliberate or satisfying explanation at all.
In this respect, as much as in its conclusion, Justice Hugo Black's
opinion for the Court presented a striking contrast to Justice Meyer's lengthy
and exhaustive opinion. Meyer had methodically reviewed a sweeping array
of prior judicial decisions, state and federal; Black, by contrast, cited not a
single supporting precedent-not even Everson (which he had authored).
Meyer had carefully analyzed the evidence of how the Establishment Clause
had been understood at the founding and afterwards; Black briefly noted
controversies over the Book of Common Prayer in England in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, asserted that many people came to this land in
part because of their dislike for govemmentally-sponsored prayer, and then,
with little ado, attributed a purpose of prohibiting such prayers to the
enactors of the First Amendment.69 Black did not pretend to reconcile this
attribution with those same enactors' simultaneous approval of legislative
prayer or with the long and pervasive practice of governmentally-sponsored
prayer that had seemed so compelling to the New York judges and that
Justice Potter Stewart referred to at some length in a dissenting opinion.o
The opinion's unforthcoming quality led constitutional scholar Paul
Kauper to describe it as "short and bland ... and noteworthy as much for
what it did not say as for what it did say."7  But not all the Justices were so
reticent. Justice William 0. Douglas found Black's opinion unsatisfactory.
In a note to Black, Douglas wrote, "I still do not see how most of the opinion
is relevant to the problem."72 Consequently, Douglas wrote a separate
concurring opinion in an effort to provide a more persuasive justification for
the result.
933, 934-36 (1986) (arguing that prayer invalidated in Engel was unconstitutional because
coercive).
66. See Patrick M. Garry, The Institutional Side of Religious Liberty, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155,
1170 ("Under the First Amendment, schools should not be permitted to force children to adhere to a
creed contrary to the moral or religious teaching of their family. For this reason, school prayer cases
should only be analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause.").
67. Cf Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (ruling that the Free Speech Clause precludes
state from compelling citizens to affirm prescribed ideas).
68. However, the presentation in Engel to some extent tracked that of Everson. In each case,
Justice Black described a pattern in which Old World evils associated with established religion led
colonizers to come to America, where the old practices and evils were reintroduced but then, with
experience and the passage of time, were prohibited, first in Virginia, and then by the First
Amendment.
69. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-30.
70. Id. at 446-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71. Paul G. Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, in
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 6 (Donald A. Gianella ed., 1963). Louis Fisher defends the
decision but suggests that it provoked misunderstanding and angry reaction in part because of the
"the clumsy and tactless way it was written and presented." LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
AMERICA 123 (2002).
72. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 128.
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But Douglas's reasoning was, if anything, even less cogent.
Surprisingly, Douglas shunned several potentially promising lines of
argument. The prayer was not an imposition of religion on students, he
thought, because "there is no element of compulsion or coercion in New
York's regulation," nor was there any "effort at indoctrination" or "any
element of proselytizing." McCollum was distinguishable, Douglas said,
and Everson, far from providing support for his conclusion, was an obstacle
to overcome.74 The real problem, he insisted, had to do with money: New
York was transgressing the Constitution by "financ[ing] a religious
exercise."
Douglas's emphasis on money reflected a larger project or vision: he
believed that any sort of public financial support for religion should be
deemed unconstitutional. This concern would be articulated more fully and
vehemently a few years later when he would argue, in Walz v. Tax
Commission,7 6 that tax exemptions for churches were unconstitutional. But
whatever the merits of Douglas's view on financing, his argument hardly
seems the most perspicuous explanation for why school prayer was
unconstitutional.
After all, the prayer did not directly, or as a practical matter, cost the
taxpayers anything. It was administered, to be sure, by teachers who
received a salary, as Douglas pointed out.77 But given that the recital of the
prayer would take less than a minute during the school day-"about the
same amount of time," Douglas observed, "that our Crier spends announcing
the opening of our sessions and offering a prayer for this Court""7 -the
expenditure was both indirect and de minimis. And invalidating the exercise
would not save taxpayers a dime: no pro rata reduction in teachers' salaries
would result. A decade earlier, in Doremus v. Board of Education, the
Court had denied standing (over Douglas's dissent) to a taxpayer
challenging a school's Bible-reading practice, quoting with approval the
lower court's observation that "it is not charged . .. that the brief
interruption in the day's schooling ... adds cost to the school expenses or
varies by more than an incomputable scintilla the economy of the day's
73. Engel, 370 U.S. at 438-39.
74. Id. at 439, 443 ("My problem today would be uncomplicated but for Everson v. Board of
Education . . . .").
75. Id. at 437.
76. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
77. Engel, 370 U.S. at 441.
78. Id.
79. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
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work."80 Thus, Douglas's singular insistence that money was the problem
seemed a notable instance of the tail wagging the dog. Philip Kurland
observed that "Douglas ... would seem to have been more concerned with
the problem of federal aid to parochial education than with the facts of the
case immediately before him."81
In fact, laconic though it was, Justice Black's opinion probably came
closer to expressing the real reason animating most of those who opposed
the prayer-a reason that (for those who accepted it) rendered largely
superfluous all of Justice Meyers's painstaking reviews of founding-era
history and subsequent practice and precedent. Thus, early in his opinion,
Black emphasized that the prayer was a "religious activity."8 Indeed, with
the triumphant flourish of a lawyer who has discovered a fatal "smoking
gun" admission by an adversary, Black declared that both Justice Meyer and
the school district itself had expressly acknowledged that prayer is religious
in nature.8 ' Given this admission, it followed (for Black, anyway) that the
prayer exercise was "wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause." 84
Brief though Black's opinion was, one has the sense that in his own mind it
was longer than it needed to be. After all, the district itself had admitted
everything necessary to definitively establish the prayer's
unconstitutionality.85 And most of Black's fellow Justices evidently thought
the same.
At this point, it seems we have stumbled upon a crucial interpretive
divide. Everyone agreed that the Regents' Prayer was religious in nature
(hardly a shocking observation). So what? For the New York judges, this
obvious fact was simply the prelude to the constitutional analysis. For
Black and most of his brethren, by contrast, the fact settled the debate: once
the religious nature of the prayer was conceded, the conclusion of invalidity
inexorably followed.87  Foreshadowing recurring controversies under the
"no-endorsement" doctrine articulated just over two decades later," the
Engel Court evidently assumed that in order to salvage its practice, the
school district would have needed to make the heroic (or preposterous)
argument that the prayer was somehow not religious.
On that assumption, it seems the New York judges' constitutional
understanding was seriously deficient. Acknowledging that the Regents'
80. Id. at 431.
81. Kurland, supra note 7, at 157.
82. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
83. Id. at 424-25.
84. Id. at 424.
85. Id. at 424-25.
86. See Engel v. Vitale, 176 N.E.2d 579, 580-81 (N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421.
87. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-25.
88. See infra notes 314-20 and accompanying text.
89. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
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Prayer was religious and then asking whether it was constitutional, Justice
Meyer was like the innocent observer of a sports event who naively asks, "I
know that the Yankees scored more runs, but who won the game?"9o
But exactly how and where had Meyer and his judicial colleagues gone
astray? In Engel, the Supreme Court did little to answer that question.
Apparently the matter seemed so axiomatic as not to require-or perhaps
even permit?-explanation. The next year, however, in Abington School
District v. Schempp, the Court made a more serious effort to explain and
justify its position.
B. The Explanation: Schempp
In Schempp, the Court considered a statutorily mandated practice of
beginning each school day in Pennsylvania schools with the reading of ten
Bible verses without commentary, followed by recitation of what is often
called "The Lord's Prayer" from the New Testament.9' The Court's bottom
line in Schempp matched that in Engel. Writing for the majority, Justice
Tom Clark noted that the trial court had found that the Bible-prayer exercise
was a "religious ceremony," and he concluded that "[g]iven that finding, the
exercises . . . are in violation of the Establishment Clause."92
Clark's somewhat mechanical majority opinion offered little analysis
but consisted mostly of a long string of quotations from previous cases
followed by a conclusion. His opinion was supplemented, though, by a
more careful and deliberate opinion by Justice William Brennan, 93 which
might be viewed as the counterpart or response to the searching opinion of
Justice Meyer in the Engel case. Like Meyer, Brennan reviewed the early
history of the Establishment Clause. 94 But he argued that a "too literal quest
for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases
seems . . . futile and misdirected . . .. Instead, history should be
consulted for "broad purposes, not specific practices."9 And the broad
purpose that Brennan discerned in the course of examining a large number
of precedents was one of "strict adherence to the principle of neutrality" in
90. See Engel, 176 N.E.2d at 581.
91. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1963). The case was consolidated with
Murray v. Curlett, challenging a prayer and Bible reading exercise conducted in Baltimore schools.
92. Id. at 223; see also id. at 266"67 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The religious nature of the
exercises here challenged seems plain. Unless Engel v. Vitale is to be overruled, or we are to engage
in wholly disingenuous distinction, we cannot sustain these practices.").
93. See id. at 230-304.
94. Id. at 232-38.
95. Id. at 237.
96. Id. at 241.
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matters of religion.97  Neutrality, in turn, entailed "a public secular
education."98 School prayer was religious, not secular, Brennan reasoned,
and hence it violated the obligation of neutrality-as-secularism.
With less analysis, Justice Clark's majority opinion accepted and even
codified this reasoning. Thus, Clark agreed that what the Establishment
Clause required of government was a "wholesome 'neutrality"' toward
religion. 9 And neutrality meant that government must remain in the domain
of the secular. To that end, Clark announced a constitutional "test": "[T]o
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause," he declared, "there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."'" This test provided the first two
requirements of what would later become known as the three-part "Lemon
test."1os
In sum, the Schempp Court construed the Establishment Clause to
require governmental neutrality in matters of religion, 10 2 and it interpreted
neutrality to mean that the state must limit itself to acting for secular
purposes and in ways that would have primarily secular effects. Prayer, as
everyone acknowledged, was a religious exercise.'03 But if school prayer
was religious, it was therefore not secular, and therefore not neutral, and
therefore not within the proper domain of the public schools, and therefore
not constitutional.
97. Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
98. Id at 242 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 222 (majority opinion); see also id at 215.
100. Id at 222.
101. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In Schempp, Justice Brennan also
offered his own three-part doctrine or test, though his proposal did not have the good fortune to be
codified as a regular Establishment Clause doctrine. Brennan declared that the Constitution "enjoins
those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious
activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious
purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where secular means
would suffice." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas reiterated his financial rationale but also agreed that
the Constitution requires governmental "neutrality" in matters of religion. Schempp. 374 U.S. at 229
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Harlan, likewise endorsed the
obligation of neutrality, while emphasizing that this obligation permitted and even in some
circumstances required governmental accommodation of religion, lest neutrality devolve into "a
brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious." Id at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Paul Kauper observed that although earlier cases
had referred to neutrality, the "really distinctive" feature of Schempp was its emphasis on this as its
central theme. Kauper, supra note 71, at I1. "The new emphasis in Schempp is on the neutrality
principle." Id. at 38.
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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C Unanswered Questions
Although Schempp and particularly Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion went some distance toward explaining the conclusion that Engel had
presented in more peremptory fashion, major questions remained
unanswered. The assertion that government must be neutral toward religion
was not novel; Everson v. Board ofEducation had said as much.'" But why
did the Schempp Court so confidently equate neutrality with governmental
secularism?
The question was highlighted by Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in
Schempp, in which he elaborated upon his dissent in Engel. Stewart agreed
that the Constitution required governmental neutrality toward religion.105
But that proposition, he thought, required "an analysis of just what the
'neutrality' is which is required by the interplay of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses,"'06 and Stewart was not satisfied with the
pronouncements on this point by the majority and Justice Brennan. What
their opinions overlooked was that many citizens believe (sometimes as a
matter of their own religious faith) that prayer is a public obligation, not
merely a private one, and hence that it has a place in the schools. In
rejecting the beliefs of these citizens, Stewart reasoned, a ruling prohibiting
school prayer offended neutrality: the ruling "is seen, not as the realization
of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism,
or"-here, perhaps sensing that he had overreached, Stewart hastened to
soften his claim-"at the least, as government support of the beliefs of those
who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private." 0 7
In Stewart's view, the obligation of neutrality supported a conclusion
precisely contrary to the majority's: on the assumption that the prayer
exercises were voluntary, "permission of such exercises . . . is necessary if
the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of religion." 08
In sum, both the majority and Justice Stewart agreed that the state and
the public schools should be neutral toward religion.'09 But the majority
applied this requirement with an eye toward those (such as the plaintiffs)
who opposed the Bible and prayer exercise, and so the Court concluded that
school prayer was not neutral.110 Stewart, by contrast, seemed more
104. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947).
105. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id at 226 (majority opinion); id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. See id. at 223 (majority opinion).
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cognizant of those who believed that public prayer was proper or obligatory,
and he accordingly inferred that a prohibition of school prayer violated
neutrality by rejecting the religious beliefs and commitments of these
citizens. "1  Ostensibly starting from the same premise, the majority
concluded that neutrality entailed governmental secularism, while Stewart
reasoned that completely secular public schools were themselves not neutral
toward religion.
Commenting on the case in the annual Supreme Court Review, Harvard
professor Ernest Brown saw a vexing "dilemma" in this disagreement.112
Schools inevitably teach moral values, Brown observed, and while a theistic
approach to this task is surely not "neutral," a purely secular approach to
values inculcation will likewise conflict with the views of students and
parents who believe that moral values necessarily rest on a religious or
theistic foundation."' Acknowledging "the impossibility of any substantive
decision that was not non-neutral to a substantial extent," 1 4 and troubled by
what he perceived as a serious problem of "standing" under the
Establishment Clause,11s Brown wished that the Court had avoided a
decision on the merits or that it had addressed the controversy in free-
exercise terms.
In the ensuing decades, the ideal of governmental neutrality would
continue to dominate Religion Clause jurisprudence, and the ideal would
accordingly come in for a good deal of academic scrutiny. One common
observation would be that a law's or practice's "neutrality" can be judged
only relative to some baseline.11 6 An analogy is to an athletic contest, in
which the referees are expected to be "neutral" in officiating the game. This
expectation entails that the referees will enforce the rules, whatever they are,
evenly and consistently against both teams. The requirement of neutrality
has meaning relative to the baseline provided by the rules of the game;
conversely, without such rules, the demand that the referees call the game in
a "neutral" fashion would make little sense. What would it even mean to
call fouls in a "neutral" fashion if there are no rules specifying what a foul
is?
Similarly, given some constitutional baseline about how government is
supposed to treat religion, the government can be neutral by complying
111. Id. at 317 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Ernest J. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 14 (1963).
113. Id. at 12-15.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id. at 15-31.
116. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY IN AMERICAN LAW, ch. 2
(forthcoming); I DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 3, 17-19; Larry
Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 793
(1993).
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consistently with that baseline or by enforcing it evenly against all citizens
and institutions, whatever their religious beliefs or dispositions. On this
understanding, we might say that although the majority and Justice Stewart
both embraced a requirement of governmental neutrality toward religion,
they were evidently interpreting that requirement against the backdrop of
different (albeit largely unarticulated) baselines.
But what were those baselines, exactly? 17 Where did they come from?
And why did the Justices embrace the particular baselines they implicitly
adopted? On these questions, the opinions were less than forthcoming: the
Justices seemed to suppose that the notion of "neutrality" itself was
somehow self-explanatory or self-interpreting. Thus, a major question left
by the cases concerned the choice of baselines against which the requirement
of neutrality was or should be interpreted.
This question relates closely to another set of questions that the
decisions left open: in the larger scheme of things, how significant were the
school prayer decisions? How narrow or how sweeping were their
implications and consequences? Contemporary assessments differed
drastically. Alarmed critics of the decisions foresaw far-reaching, even
radical, consequences.118  Justice Douglas agreed but did so with
enthusiasm, rather than alarm. Thus, in his Engel concurrence, Douglas
indicated that the opening invocation at Supreme Court sessions ("God save
the United States and this honorable Court")"' was as constitutionally
infirm as school prayer: "the principle is the same, no matter how briefly the
prayer is said . . . ."120 And in footnotes he provided a list of other measures
vulnerable to potential invalidation: the national motto ("In God We Trust"),
the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, legislative and military
chaplains, Presidential religious proclamations, the use of the Bible in
117. In retrospect, we might read the cases as adopting a baseline of governmental secularism and
then applying the neutrality requirement relative to that baseline; indeed, my argument is that this
was the effect of the decisions. In the opinions themselves, however, the logic seems to run the
other way: the primary obligation that the cases take from the Establishment Clause is the obligation
of neutrality, it seems, and the obligation of public secularism is derived from (or perhaps viewed as
simply identical to) that requirement of neutrality.
118. A Wall Street Journal editorial opined that the majority opinion "must logically require the
excision of all those other countless official references to God, such as in the Declaration of
Independence; the Pledge of Allegiance; the Star-Spangled Banner; and the words used to inaugurate
the President, open the Congress, and convoke the Supreme Court itself." Editorial, reprinted in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE SUPREME COURT 138 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993). Senator Strom
Thurmond described Engel as a "major triumph for the forces of secularism and atheism which are
bent on throwing God completely out of our national life." Kurland, supra note 7, at 145 (quoting
Thurmond).
119. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,439 (Douglas, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 441.
963
administering official oaths-and perhaps even, Douglas hinted
tantalizingly, official recognition of the Christmas holiday. 12 1 Likewise, the
plaintiffs' attorney in Engel and the ACLU predicted wide-ranging
consequences. 122
By contrast, the Court itself confined its rulings to particular school
prayer and Bible exercises, and Justice Brennan emphasized the limited
reach of the rulings. Where Douglas exuberantly presented measures ripe
for possible invalidation, Brennan soberly enumerated and discussed a range
of issues that, he said, the school prayer decisions did not resolve, including
legislative prayer, non-devotional use of the Bible in schools, tax
exemptions for churches, and the national motto. 123
But however sincere Brennan's disclaimers may have been, with the
benefit of hindsight it is difficult to take them fully at face value. For
example, Brennan maintained (somewhat coyly, perhaps) that legislative
prayer "might well represent no involvements of the kind prohibited by the
Establishment Clause."l 24 Two decades later, however, when that issue was
presented to the Court in Marsh v. Chambers, Brennan not only concluded
that legislative prayer was unconstitutional, but he thought that this
conclusion was obvious and inescapable precisely on the basis of the secular
purpose and effect requirements articulated in Schempp and later absorbed
into the Lemon test. 125 Brennan's later opinion suggests that even if he and
his brethren did not fully realize or at least acknowledge the fact at the time,
the school prayer cases and the doctrine they announced did in fact have
implications that extended beyond the public schools.
But how far beyond? And with what implications? These questions are
connected to the previous one about baselines, because the full implications
of the decisions depended on what constitutional baseline the Court was
implicitly importing into its constitutional analysis, and why. In order to
investigate those questions, therefore, we need to look more closely at that
fundamental issue. What baseline, or what basic conception of the relation
between government and religion, animated the school prayer decisions?
We can more fully appreciate that question and its answer if we step back
from the decisions and survey the possibilities on offer.
121. Id at 437 n.1, 440 n.5, 442 n.8.
122. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 133.
123. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
125. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796-801 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at
800-01 ("1 have no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of
Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be
unconstitutional."). The Marsh Court itself deflected that conclusion only by declining to apply the
Lemon test in deference to longstanding tradition. Id. at 792 (majority opinion).
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1II. A CRAZY-QUILT, QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
Unlike its European ancestors, the American republic from the outset
eschewed any religious orthodoxyl 26 (and perhaps, it is sometimes
sanguinely suggested, any sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy, religious
or otherwise)127 . But the decision to forego an established religion did not
relieve Americans of the continuous task of thinking about-and arguing
about, on an ongoing basis-the proper relation between government and
religion. For one thing, in a nation in which a large majority of citizens has
been and continues to be religious in diverse and shifting ways, the issue
could hardly be avoided. For another-paradoxically, perhaps-a political
community self-consciously constituted in part on a commitment to maintain
a separation of government from established religion may need to give more
attention to the matter than a community lacking such a commitment would.
What exactly is the government supposed to keep itself separate from? And
separate in what ways?
So despite (or because of) the constitutional commitment to separation
of church and state, Americans from the beginning have pondered and
argued about the relation between religion and political community.128
Their various views have of course been complicated and diverse. But with
the simplification that we necessarily impose on history in order to engage
with it, we can discern two broad views, or families of views, that run
through American political thought and culture from the beginning.
A. The Perennial Contenders
Describing the current political landscape with respect to religion, Noah
Feldman sorts the most prominent actors and views into two main families
or camps, which he calls "values evangelicals" and "legal secularists."
These families are to be distinguished not only from each other but also from
more extreme positions to which their critics sometimes assimilate them,
carelessly or for polemical purposes. Thus, the family of values evangelicals
includes many Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and even people who do not
126. The eschewal was expressed through silence-namely, through a failure to adopt any
national religion-but also explicitly in Article VI's prohibition on religious tests for public office,
and later, of course, in the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 3; id.
amend. I, cl.1.
127. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Robert D.
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104,
1134 (1979).
128. Cf NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 5 (observing that "no question divides Americans
more fundamentally than that of the relation between religion and government").
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identify with any particular religious tradition but who believe in public
morality and are friendly to religion, including a sort of generic public
religion, as a basis for this morality.12 9 Feldman's values evangelicals are a
far cry, however, from more sectarian and theocratic believers, such as the
so-called Christian Reconstructionists, who would reconstruct America on
the model of Calvin's Geneva. 130  Conversely, legal secularists urge the
maintenance of a secular regime but only in the public sphere;' 3 1 their view
is to be distinguished from what Feldman calls "strong secularism" that
constitutes "a comprehensive worldview that present[s] itself as an
alternative to religious conceptions of the world" and that is "concerned with
removing religion from the public sphere as a corollary to the general goal of
removing superstitious religion from all human thought and decision
making."l 32
Feldman's interpretation of American political culture as divided
between values evangelicals and legal secularists is reminiscent of the much-
discussed diagnosis offered some years earlier by the sociologist James
Davison Hunter. Hunter found that across a wide variety of seemingly
independent political and social issues, Americans tend to coalesce into two
broad camps, which he called "orthodox" and "progressive." 33  The
"orthodox" camp, reflecting a "biblical theism" that includes many
Catholics, Protestants, and Jews,13 4 is defined by "the commitment on the
part of adherents to an external, definable, and transcendent authority."135
This authority "tells us what is good, what is true, how we should live, and
who we are."l3 6 By contrast, the progressive camp is composed of both
"secularists," who adhere to no religion, and also persons who, though
counting themselves religious, place their trust in "personal experience or
scientific rationality" over "the traditional sources of moral authority,
whether scripture, papal pronouncements, or Jewish law." 37
Hunter argued that these contrasting perspectives are central to their
adherents' views on a host of political issues and indeed to their
understanding of what America most fundamentally is.138  The conflict
between these constituencies "amounts to a fairly comprehensive and
momentous struggle to define the meaning of America-of how and on what
129. Id. at 7-8, 186-212.
130. See, e.g., ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE (1984).
131. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 8, 150-85.
132. Id. at 129.
133. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 43-44
(1991).
134. Id. at 71.
135. Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id at 44-45.
138. Id. at 46-51.
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terms will Americans live together, of what comprises the good society."' 39
Looking back in American history, we can perceive antecedents to these
two broad visions. Thus, Feldman describes the widespread commitment
through much of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century to what
was commonly described as "nonsectarianism," particularly in the area of
public education.140  Nineteenth-century nonsectarianism held that "there
were moral principles shared in common by all Christian sects, independent
of their particular theological beliefs" and expressed in the Bible, which was
"the font of common morality."' 4' Thus, the proponents of nonsectarianism
were discernibly similar in their views and aspirations to Feldman's value
evangelicalsl 42 and to Hunter's "orthodox" citizens of today, the main
difference being that in the course of the twentieth century the position
expanded beyond Protestants to include Catholics, devout Jews,143 and
eventually theists generally. Justice Antonin Scalia's recent commendation
of a tradition of non-denominational theism is very much in this vein.'"
Feldman suggests that the "secularist" position is of more recent
vintage. Indeed,
[u]ntil the 1870s, the word "secular" did not even figure in
American discussions of church and state. "Secularism" in the
contemporary sense was a term unknown to the Framers and
unmentioned by the Reconstruction Congress that drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment. As late as the Scopes trial of 1925,
"secularism" was still a term of opprobrium to most Americans,
139. Id. at 51.
140. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 57-110. Feldman points out that nonsectarianism seemed
plausible
because it relied on the basic truth that nonsectarian religion pervaded American public
life. Criminal laws and laws prohibiting adultery did rest on the bedrock of religious
Christian values. Citizens did invoke God's help when they took their oaths as witnesses
or public servants. Public prayers opened legislative sessions everywhere in America, as
they still do. All these practices were broadly understood by Americans of the nineteenth
century as fully compatible with the preservation of religious liberty.
Id. at 81.
141. Id. at 61.
142. Id at 188. Feldman notes the continuities but argues that values evangelicals have also
adapted their position in response to modem secularism and concern for minorities. Id
143. Cf HERBERG, supra note 30, at 240-41 (describing "the transition from a 'Protestant nation'
to a 'three-religion country').
144. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 893-98 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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associated as it was with radical atheism and contempt for
religion. 145
Feldman may be right about the terminology. But it is not difficult to
discern the elements of an essentially secularist vision much earlier. Thus,
though intended to be broadly inclusive, "nonsectarian" religiosity still did
not encompass everyone, and those who found themselves on the outside-
nineteenth-century Jews, Quakers, and Unitarians, for example-often
contended that the public schools should forego even the relatively generic
religion of Bible reading and prayer in favor of a regime that today would be
described as secular.146 Similarly, a secular conception is apparent in the
view (which prevailed, despite strong opposition, throughout most of the
nineteenth century) that the Post Office ought to deliver mail on every day of
the week and that a refusal to deliver the mail on Sundays would be an
improper mixing of government and religion. 147  Indeed, some historians
argue that the secularist vision (of government and politics, at least) was
present and even dominant from the nation's beginning.148
Using a different vocabulary, John Witte describes American visions of
religion and political community in terms of two "models," which he
associates with Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, respectively, and which
have competed with each other throughout American history.149  The
Jeffersonian model insisted on a fairly rigorous separation of government
from religion.5 o By contrast, Adams's model aimed to maintain a regime in
which freedom of conscience and many private religions flourished under
the general banner of a more theologically thin public religion."' A
"Publick Religion" was essential, Adams declared, to provide "the
foundation, not only of republicanism and of all free government, but of
social felicity under all governments and in all the combinations of human
society."l52
145. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 181.
146. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 29.
147. See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 283-305 (2010);
Richard R. John, Taking Sabbatarianism Seriously: The Postal System, the Sabbath, and the
Transformation ofAmerica, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 517 (1990).
148. See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A
MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE (2005 ed. 1996). For a spirited and well-documented
presentation of this interpretation, see Michael Newdow, Question to Justice Scalia: Does the
Establishment Clause Permit the Disregard ofDevout Catholics?, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 409 (2009).
149. JOHN WITTE JR., GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S JUSTICE 245-62 (2006).
150. Id. at 245-46.
151. Id at 246-51.
152. Id. at 248 (quoting JOHN ADAMS, WORKS, 9:636). Regarding the content of that "Publick
Religion," Witte explains that
[i]n Adams's view, its creed was honesty, diligence, devotion, obedience, virtue, and love
of God, neighbor, and self. Its icons were the Bible, the bells of liberty, the memorials of
patriots, the Constitution. Its clergy were public-spirited ministers and religiously
committed politicians. Its liturgy was the public proclamation of oaths, prayers, songs,
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In a similar vein, Rodney Smith distinguishes between what he calls
"Madison's position" and "Story's position."' Smith refers to responses
made to a pamphlet written in 1833 by Jasper Adams, president of
Charleston College, contending that nondenominational Christianity served
as a national religion.154 Adams sent the pamphlet to various public figures
for comment, and Madison's response, though somewhat unclear, appeared
to dissent in a separationist or secular direction. 5s By contrast, Joseph Story
warmly endorsed Adams's pamphlet, asserting that "government cannot
long exist without an allegiance with religion to some extent; and that
Christianity is indispensable to the true interests and solid foundation of free
government."' 6  John Marshall, the Chief Justice, expressed a similar
opinion, observing that "the American population is entirely Christian" and
that "[i]t would be strange indeed, if with such a people our institutions did
not presuppose Christianity."157
Although Feldman, Hunter, Witte, and Smith employ different labels
and trace their categories somewhat differently, their interpretations and
categories overlap to a significant extent, and they converge to sketch out
two major conceptions of the relation between government and religion that
have joined and jousted with each other throughout American history. We
might call one of these positions "ecumenical providentialism" and the other
''political secularism."
Depending on the prevailing demographics, providentialism has
struggled to include Protestants, or Christians, or Christians and Jews,' 58 or
and election and Thanksgiving Day sermons. Its policy was state appointment of
chaplains for the legislature, military, and prison, state sanctions against blasphemy,
sacrilege, and iconoclasm, state administration of tithe collections, test oaths, and clerical
appointments, state sponsorship of religious societies, schools, and charities.
Id. at 247.
153. RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 113-15 (1987).
154. Id.atll3.
155. Id. at 113-14.
156. Id. at ll4.
157. Id. Adams's pamphlet and the responses by Madison, Story, and Marshall are reproduced in
THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 597-614 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds.,
2009).
158. By the 1950s, Will Herberg argued, most Americans had come to believe in "the conception
of the three 'communions'-Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism--as three diverse, but equally
legitimate, equally American, expressions of an over-all American religion, standing for essentially
the same 'moral ideals' and 'spiritual values.' HERBERG, supra note 30, at 87. This "common
faith," Herberg reported, "makes no pretensions to override or supplant the recognized religions, to
which it assigns a place of great eminence and honor in the American scheme of things." Id. at 88-
89. Herberg's own assessment of this conception was complex and ambivalent, admiring yet highly
critical.
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theists generally. The position's core claims are that America's history and
institutions are subject to an overarching providence,' 59 that public morality
or civic virtue need a religious foundation, and that it is imperative for
citizens and for the nation itself to acknowledge their dependency on
Providence-but that government can and should remain noncommittal with
respect to specific creedal differences that are not important for civic or
political purposes.
The general sense of the view was nicely expressed by Dwight D.
Eisenhower, who famously insisted that "[o]ur form of government has no
sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith[,] and I don't care
what it is."' 60 Eisenhower's statement described a state of affairs that had
been observed by Tocqueville more than a century earlier.161 Indeed, Sidney
Mead argues that "Eisenhower's position in this respect, far from being
'new,' seems directly in the tradition of the founding fathers." 6 2
Political secularism,'63 by contrast, has maintained that religion is and
should be a private affair. Political secularists typically have not attempted
159. For an argument asserting the pervasiveness of this theme through American history, see
STEPHEN H. WEBB, AMERICAN PROVIDENCE 29-50 (2004).
160. Paul Horwitz, Religion and American Politics: Three Views of the Cathedral, 39 U.
MEMPHIS L. REV. 973, 978 (2009). The statement was not made casually or inadvertently, it seems,
but reflected Eisenhower's considered commitment:
The General said over and over during the campaign that when the founding fathers said
that men were endowed by their Creator with rights, they showed that the basis or
foundation of this nation and form of government lay in a "deeply felt religious faith."
Our government is the attempt to "translate" that religion into the political world. He
said that no other nation has American's "spiritual and moral strength." He said that "the
Almighty takes a definite and direct interest day by day in the progress of this nation."
MILLER, supra note 29, at 34.
161. See, e.g., I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 308 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1875) ("The sects which exist in the United States are innumerable. They all differ in respect to the
worship which is due from man to his Creator; but they all agree in respect to the duties which are
due from man to man... . Society has no future life to hope for or to fear; and provided the citizens
profess a religion, the peculiar tenets of that religion are of very little importance to its interests."
(emphasis added)).
162. SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE NATION WITH THE SOUL OF A CHURCH 25 (1975). Mead's title refers
to Chesterton's famous observation after a trip to the United States that this country was "a nation
with the soul of a church." 21 G. K. CHESTERTON, What I Saw in America, in G. K. CHESTERTON:
COLLECTED WORKS 35, 45 (1990). More recently, a similar theme is discernible in the work of
Michael Perry. In his first book, Perry discussed how the constitutional commitment to human
rights is grounded in what Perry described as "a basic, irreducible feature of the American people's
understanding of themselves ... [that] can be described, for want of a better word, as religious."
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97 (1982). Perry
argued that "this religious American self-understanding ... supplies the crucial context in which the
function of noninterpretive judicial review in human rights cases is finally clarified." Id. at 98.
However, he hastened to make clear that he was not referring to any particular religion or kind of
religion. Id at 99 ("My point is in no sense a metaphysical or supernaturalistic one.... I invoke no
assumptions about any deity or any divinely ordained 'natural law."').
163. The term is useful to distinguish political secularism from secularism as a more
comprehensive philosophical position, much in the way that John Rawls distinguished political
liberalism from "comprehensive liberalism." See JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxix (1996).
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to oppose or suppress religion: on the contrary, they have sought to respect
religion and to maintain religious freedom. Indeed, some have argued for
political secularism primarily on religious grounds.'" But political
secularists have insisted that religion is not something that should be
expressed or acted upon by government and its agencies and institutions,
especially including the public schools.
B. Incompatible but (Sometimes) Indistinguishable
Contemplated in their abstract purity, ecumenical providentialism and
political secularism would seem to be fundamentally different and even
incompatible outlooks.' 6 1 Providentialists declare that God works in history,
that it is important as a people to acknowledge this providential
superintendence, and that the community should actively instill such beliefs
in children as a basis for civic virtue. Secularists, by contrast, insist that
acknowledgments of deity (if there is one) ought to be purely private, and
that government acts improperly if it enters into religion or expresses or
endorses religious beliefs. Thus, what one constituency views as imperative,
the other regards as forbidden.
And yet, despite this apparent and at some level actual incompatibility,
in some contexts the different positions can become blended-or blurred.
Convergences. The possibility of blending these positions results in part
from the fact that each represents a family of related views, not a single
unified creed; these various views may form more of a spectrum than a sharp
divide. Moreover, each position has what we might call propositional or
creedal dimensions and also cultural or traditional dimensions. So, it is
possible for individuals to accept a position in one sense but not in other
senses, and hence to embrace different aspects of the different positions.
In addition, perhaps in defiance of abstract logic, many Americans may
simply find themselves drawn to incompatible positions.166 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, for instance, was the principal sponsor of the so-called "no
164. For an excellent recent example, see DARRYL HART, A SECULAR FAITH: WHY CHRISTIANITY
FAVORS THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2006).
165. Cf HUNTER, supra note 133, at 128 ("Each side of the cultural divide ... speaks with a
different moral vocabulary. Each side operates out of a different mode of debate and persuasion.
Each side represents the tendencies of a separate and competing moral galaxy. They are, indeed,
worlds apart."').
166. Cf HENRY F. MAY, THE DIVIDED HEART: ESSAYS ON PROTESTANTISM AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 177 (1991) ("[During most of the nineteenth century] most
Americans believed at the same time that man was a sinner dependent on unmerited grace and that
he was endowed with the right and ability to govern himself. Anybody who can understand this
paradox-if there is anybody-can claim to understand nineteenth-century America.").
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endorsement" doctrine, under which government is prohibited from doing or
saying things that send messages endorsing religion.i16 The logic of that
doctrine may seem-and is, I will suggest' 61-squarely on the side of the
secularist conception of America. Curiously, however, O'Connor initially
proposed the doctrine as a rationale for explaining why including a nativity
scene in a municipal Christmas display was permissible. And not long after
advocating the "no endorsement" test, O'Connor caused a minor stir by
lending her support to a "Christian nation" initiative. (When criticism was
offered, a seemingly surprised O'Connor promptly recanted, or rather
clarified.)169
If O'Connor seemed to have a foot in both camps, she might point to a
distinguished predecessor in Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson, of course, is often
claimed by secularists as a founder and champion of their party. 7 o And they
can cite evidence in support of that characterization: Jefferson's famous
"wall of separation" letter,' 7' for example, or his refusal as President to
declare national days of thanksgiving and prayer,17 2 or his opposition to the
then common view (espoused by luminaries such as Justice Story and
Chancellor Kent) that Christianity is embedded in the common law.' But
Jefferson also firmly declared a providential role in America's history,174
and his eloquent use of religious language in his Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom'75 and in his presidential inauguration addresses 76 might
easily support assigning him to the providentialist camp.
167. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. See infra notes 352-59.
169. For a discussion of the incident, see Christopher E. Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or
Accommodation: The Changing Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 893,
937-38(1991).
170. See, e.g., SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECULARISM 43 (2004).
171. See, e.g., KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 148, at 200 (asserting that "Jefferson's metaphor
... is a powerful statement about the need for a secular state"). The letter and associated letters and
explanations are reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 157, at 525-29. For
a different interpretation suggesting that Jefferson's wall mostly separated federal from state
jurisdiction, see DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55-70 (2002).
172. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 622-24 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
173. Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST. REv. 27,
43 (1998).
174. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: WITH A NEW PREFACE
225-34 (1993).
175. Jefferson's Statute began with the declaration that "Almighty God hath created the mind
free" and that governmental coercion in matters of religion represented "a departure from the plan of
the Holy Author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate
it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do." Virginia Act for Religious Freedom,
reprinted in CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 63-64 (J.F.
Maclear ed., 1995).
176. Consider Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as
Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with all the
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The ambiguity of the "secular. " Another factor that facilitates a
blurring of the positions is terminology, which is both variable and loose.
One term in particular-"secular"---has often been a source of confusion.",
I have tried to follow dominant current usage in describing the interpretation
opposing government-sponsored religion as "secularist." But in fact the
term has various shades of meaning, and virtually everyone throughout
American history (and indeed throughout western history, including in the
era of Christendom) has believed that government is supposed to be
"secular" in some important sense.' 78  Thus, Nomi Stolzenberg has
explained that "[t]he secular was, in fact, originally a religious concept, a
product of traditional religious epistemological frameworks."l 79  In its
classical meaning, the term referred to the here and now of this world,
understood as a "a specialized area of God's domain."' 80 In this sense,
medieval governments were Christian but also "secular" in much the same
way as were the so-called "secular clergy"-namely, priests who worked in
parishes rather than retreating to monasteries. Both were "secular" not by
being "not religious" but rather by working "in the world."181 Governments
were to concern themselves with this world, not the next one, because the
providential ordering had so ordained. But it in no way followed that
governments should avoid considering, invoking, or acting on religious
truths that were relevant to their this-worldly business.
necessaries and comforts of life, who has covered our infancy with His providence and
our riper years with His wisdom and power, and to whose goodness I ask you to join in
supplications with me ....
Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1805), reprinted in JOHN T. NOONAN JR. &
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 206 (2001).
177. Nomi Stolzenberg describes the "modem cultural deformity that finds expression in
frightening levels of mutual incomprehension and antipathy between 'the religious' and 'the secular'
that we see today." Nomi Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, in LAW AND THE SACRED 35 (Austin
Sarat et al. eds., 2007). Stolzenberg's essay provides a valuable discussion of the ways in which the
concept has been altered and, arguably, distorted.
178. See Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31 (Rajeev
Bhargava ed., 1998). For a discussion of how even during the period of Christendom government
was expected to be "secular" and of how the dominant meanings of the term have changed, see
STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 112-50 (2010).
179. Stolzenberg, supra note 177, at 30. Stolzenberg elaborates:
The concept of the secular always served the function of distinguishing religious from
nonreligious domains. But nonreligious domains did not, in the premodern view, exist
outside the religious epistemological framework. On the contrary, that framework of
meaning was all-encompassing, overarching, comprehending within it every domain of
human (and nonhuman) action and cognition, both the spiritual and the temporal, the holy
and the unholy, the ecclesiastical and the secular, the sacred and the profane.
Id. at 30-31.
180. Id. at 31.
181. See JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 13 (1994).
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Virtually all Americans, whether inclined to the providentialist or
secularist conception, have likewise believed that governments should be
"secular" at least in this classical sense. 182 Consequently, the proposition
that "government must be secular," depending on what sense is being given
to the term, may be either a bland platitude on which nearly all Americans
can unite or a call to cultural and political battle. The term's variableness
has been both an ongoing cause of confusion and a source of sometimes
rhetorically useful equivocation that contestants have unconsciously or
perhaps deliberately exploited. We will see how this slippage facilitated the
quiet transformation effected by the school prayer decisions.
The possibility of blending the competing conceptions is evident in a
historical survey by John Jeffries and James Ryan. Jeffries and Ryan
describe the political atmosphere of mid-twentieth-century America-the
period just preceding the school prayer cases-in terms that systematically
conflate the providential and secularist views.183 If Jeffries and Ryan seem
to overlook or obliterate vital differences, however, they are not simply
being sloppy; rather, they are following and accurately capturing the
thinking of mid-century Americans whose views they are trying to convey.
Indeed, writing in the middle of that period, Will Herberg noted that
"[e]very aspect of contemporary religious life reflects this paradox-
pervasive secularism amid mounting religiosity . . . ."'8 Struck by the fact
that "[t]he secularism characteristic of the American mind is implicit and is
not felt to be at all inconsistent with the most sincere attachment to religion,"
Herberg remarked: "So thoroughly secularist has American religion become
that the familiar distinction between religion and secularism appears to be
losing much of its meaning under present-day conditions."185
Blessed blurring? An academician devoted to conceptual purity might
deplore this mushing together of distinct and even incompatible views. But
as a matter of practical politics, such obfuscation has arguably been of great
value: it has permitted people of fundamentally different views and
commitments to live together in relative peace without fully perceiving how
different their views actually are.' 86
Mark Noll observes that "[d]uring and after the war for independence, a
wide range of Americans joined together Protestant Christian beliefs and
secular political convictions as they were joined nowhere else in the world,"
and this "merger proved exceedingly useful for many projects, both religious
182. For further discussion, see Steven D. Smith, How is America "Divided by God"?, 27 Miss.
C. L. REV. 141, 149-51 (2007).
183. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 309-11.
184. HERBERG, supra note 30, at 2.
185. Id. at 270.
186. A similar point might be made on a more personal level: an individual may hold radically
incompatible views and commitments but feel no great internal dissonance because he or she does
not perceive this incompatibility.
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and political."' 87  The blurring of positions may also help account for the
fact that different observers can look at contemporary American society and
perceive either broad consensus or sharp cultural division, depending in part
on whether they focus on society in general or on more careful and articulate
spokespersons for the competing positions.'88
Nonetheless, at bottom the fundamental difference in views is a deep
one, even if it is often smudged or smoothed over in practice. Consequently,
the roping together of these views always threatens to unravel; if some
contexts serve to conceal the underlying conflict, others work to bring it into
the open. The school prayer litigation would be one such context.
C. Patterns ofDominance?
So, if American history has supported rival, and at some level
incompatible, providential and secularist self-understandings, which of these
contenders has had the upper hand? At least if we limit ourselves for now to
the period preceding the school prayer decisions, the simple answer would
seem to be ... neither-not in any uniform and official way at least.
Ups and downs. To be sure, different observers and advocates discern
(or think they discern) trajectories. A common view sees the nation as
having been predominantly religious at its inception and through much of
the nineteenth century, but as becoming steadily more secular as the
twentieth century progressed.'89 This interpretation has the attractive feature
of making American history conform to the way many eminent thinkers
have believed history was supposed to unfold-namely, in the direction of
an ever-increasing secularization.190 A differently oriented (though not
187. Mark A. Noll, The Contingencies of Christian Republicanism: An Alternative Account of
Protestantism and the American Founding, in PROTESTANTISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 225,
239, 238 (Thomas S. Engeman & Michael P. Zuckert eds., 2004).
188. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, IS THERE A CULTURE WAR?: A DIALOGUE
ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (E.J. Dionne Jr. & Michael Cromartie eds., 2006).
189. See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 170, at 6 (describing "a slow, uneven movement away from
Americans' original definition of themselves as a Protestant Christian people").
190. Jos6 Casanova explains:
In one form or another, with the possible exception of Alexis de Tocqueville, Vilfredo
Pareto, and William James, the thesis of secularization was shared by all the founding
fathers: from Karl Marx to John Stuart Mill, from Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer,
from E. B. Tylor to James Frazer, from Ferdinand Toennies to Georg Simmel, from
Emile Durkheim to Max Weber, from Wilhelm Wundt to Sigmund Freud, from Lester
Ward to William G. Sumner, from Robert Park to George H. Mead. Indeed, the
consensus was such that not only did the theory remain uncontested but apparently it was
not even necessary to test it, since everybody took it for granted.
CASANOVA, supra note 181, at 17 (footnote omitted).
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necessarily incompatible) interpretation insists that the nation's founders
intended to institute a secular government and that this intention was largely
honored through much of the nation's history but that an infusion of
religious fervor diverted the nation from its prescribed secular course in the
latter half of the twentieth century.' 91 Both interpretations are sometimes
offered for polemical purposes, of course, as advocates attempt to claim the
nation's founders (or the Constitution itself) for their causes, and to depict
contemporary developments that they oppose in terms of deviancy or
decline. 192
But in reality the nation's history has been more complicated-more
confused, perhaps-so that (with an important exception, to be noted
shortly) no simple generalization can come close to capturing what has
happened.19 3 It seems most accurate to say that providentialist and secularist
visions have been in perpetual competition-often, as noted, in a somewhat
muted or muddled competition in which fundamental differences have been
blended or blurred-and that although each has achieved a fragile
ascendency from time to time and place to place, at least into the 1960s,
neither position was able to establish itself securely as the official or clearly
dominant national orthodoxy.
Thus, far from reflecting any smooth trajectory from "religious" to
"secular" (or vice versa), the nation's history seems more accurately
described as a series of swings or waves-or perhaps of lurches. Seeking to
describe the ebbs and flows of religion and of religious influence on politics,
historians frequently resort to the vocabulary of "revivals" and
"Awakenings" 9 4 and, in the opposite direction, of a succession of
"disestablishments."l 95 Even these images are simplifications,'96 of course,
useful for picking out particular salient events or developments.
191. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 148, at 200, 204 (asserting that "the Constitution
created a secular state" but that religious intervention "has poisoned American politics in the past
fifteen years").
192. For a discussion of how cultural factions use "history as ideology," see HUNTER, supra note
133, at 108-16.
193. Cf Noll, supra note 187, at 226 ("Recent historical writing has made it abundantly clear that
simplistic summaries cannot deal with the multivalent, tumultuous, and often extraordinarily fluid
ideas of America's founding era.").
194. A standard view discerns a major revival of religion, or "Great Awakening," in the first half
of the eighteenth century, and a Second Great Awakening in the early nineteenth century. See
MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 91-113, 166-
90 (1992). As noted, Will Herberg described "the great and almost unprecedented upsurge of
religiosity under way today" in the post-World War 11 period. HERBERG, supra note 30, at 256; see
also I DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, A Conscripted Prophet's Guesses About the Future ofReligious Liberty
in America (Oct. 25, 2007), in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 445,
446 ("We have for some time been in the midst of a great outpouring of evangelical religious fervor,
which I will call the Fourth Great Awakening. . . .").
195. For an interpretation indicating three "disestablishments"-the first in the founding period,
the second in the early twentieth century, the third in the late twentieth century-see PHILLIP E.
HAMMOND, RELIGION AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY: THE THIRD DISESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA 8-
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The early nineteenth century, for instance, experienced what is
commonly described as the Second Great Awakening, involving a series of
dramatic revivals in places like Cane Ridge, Kentucky. The antics produced
in the converted by these revivals-jerking, dancing, barking, "treeing the
devil," and other remarkable behaviors1 97 - seem perfectly designed to
capture the attention of curious observers and historians. Still, it is not as if
all Americans in the early 1800s were down on all fours barking at demons
in trees any more than all Americans in 1969 were getting high or making
love in the mud at Woodstock. In both instances, vivid or extreme behavior
captures attention; meanwhile, most Americans presumably were staying at
home, going to work, and on their Sabbath going to church (or not going to
church), as they had always done.198
If public or visible religiosity has waxed and waned from one period to
another, it has also varied among localities. Noah Feldman describes a
generically religious "nonsectarianism," implemented through Bible reading
and school prayer, as the view that prevailed in public education in the
nineteenth century. 99  As an effort to characterize a view that was
prominent and that serves to distinguish nineteenth-century from
contemporary pedagogy, Feldman's description is helpful. Still, even in the
nineteenth century, not all or perhaps even most schools subscribed to this
regime. In western states, it seems, few public schools used religious
exercises. Such exercises were more common in the East and South;
nonetheless, in the post-Civil War period only about half of the school
districts in New York maintained prayer or Bible-reading exercise.200
Moreover, legal challenges to school prayer and Bible reading were brought;
the challenges were accepted in some courts and rejected in others.201
11,167-77 (1992).
196. Cf JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 165
(1990) (asserting that the Great Awakening "might better be thought of as an interpretive fiction and
as an American equivalent of the Roman Empire's Donation of Constantine, the medieval forgery
that the papacy used to justify its subsequent claims to political authority").
197. See ALICE FELT TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT: PHASES OF AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY TO
1860, at 37-39 (Univ. of Minn. Press 1970) (1944).
198. For a historical overview of Americans' Sunday habits from the Puritan period through the
1950s, see CRAIG HARLINE, SUNDAY: A HISTORY OF THE FIRST DAY FROM BABYLONIA TO THE
SUPER BOWL 278-367 (2007).
199. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 61-92.
200. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 15-16.
201. Jeffries and Ryan observe that "by the early twentieth century, a few state courts had
outlawed Bible reading and other religious observances in public school as violative of state
constitutions, though most courts continued to approve these practices." Jeffries & Ryan, supra note
4, at 304 (citations omitted). For a list of state court decisions invalidating school prayer or Bible
reading, see id. at 304 n.129.
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The secularization of the cultural elite. The National Education
Association ("NEA") began in the mid-nineteenth century with a heavy
emphasis on a "nonsectarian" but overtly religious agenda.202 By the latter
decades of the century, however, its leaders (though perhaps not its rank-
and-file members) had shifted dramatically in favor of thoroughly secular
schools, and this shift persisted and deepened in the twentieth century.203
This change in the NEA's position reflects one social stratum in which
the "crazy quilt" description may be inapt and in which history may indeed
have followed a steadier trajectory from "religious" to "secular." 204 Elites
and professional associations, that is, do seem to have followed
approximately this course of evolving secularization. Thus, George
Marsden chronicles the transformation of American private universities,
most of which were founded by churches and began with a distinctly
religious conception of their mission but became steadily more secularized
during the course of the twentieth century.205 Sociologist Christian Smith
describes the secularization of American educational, legal, media, and
scientific institutions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
through the efforts of "networks of activists who were largely skeptical,
freethinking, agnostic, atheist, or theologically liberal; who were well
educated and socially located mainly in knowledge-production
occupations .... 206
The secular movement among cultural elites was a development of great
importance for government and law, and we will need to return to this
theme. But the secularization of cultural elites did not faithfully mirror a
similar movement in the nation as a whole. For the nation, rather, it seems
more accurate to describe an ongoing competition-sometimes congenial
and sometimes more combative-between religious and more secular
worldviews and between the providentialist and the secularist conceptions of
America, beginning in the founding period and continuing to the present.
D. The Conceptions as Quasi-Constitutional
And what has been the legal status or quality of these competing
interpretations or national self-conceptions? It seems accurate to describe
them as "constitutional" in two important senses of the term, but not in a
202. See Kraig Beyerlein, Educational Elites and the Movement to Secularize Public Education:
The Case of the National Educational Association, in THE SECULAR REVOLUTION 160, 160
(Christian Smith ed., 2003).
203. For a discussion of this change, see id.
204. See id.
205. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT
ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF (1994).
206. Christian Smith, Introduction: Rethinking the Secularization ofAmerican Public Life, in THE
SECULAR REVOLUTION, supra note 202, at 1. The volume contains essays by a number of scholars
chronicling the course of secularization in a variety of different institutions.
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third and also crucial sense. Hence, the conceptions have had a sort of
quasi-constitutional, or perhaps "subconstitutional,"2 07 status. They have
been closer in their character to the sort of eighteenth-century
constitutionalism described by Larry Kramer that, compared to
contemporary understandings of constitutional law, was "less rigid and more
diffuse-more willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over competing
plausible interpretations of the constitution. ... 208
The competing conceptions-ecumenical providentialism and political
secularism-have been "constitutional" in the sense that they have been
embraced by their adherents as interpretations of what defines or
"constitutes" the American republic as a political community. Noah
Feldman observes that questions about the relation between government and
religion "go to the very heart of who we are as a nation. They raise the
central challenges of citizenship and peoplehood: who belongs here? To
what kind of nation do we belong?" 2 09
In a similar vein, James Davison Hunter observes that
[t]his is a conflict over how we are to order our lives together....
[It] is ultimately a struggle over national identity-over the meaning
of America, who we have been in the past, who we are now, and
perhaps most important, who we, as a nation, will aspire to become
in the new millennium.210
Consequently, the struggle expresses itself, among other ways, in competing
interpretations of the American founding. Orthodox interpreters "link[] the
nation's birth to divine will .... To them, America is, in a word, the
embodiment of Providential wisdom." 2 11 By contrast, "[t]hose on the
progressive side of the cultural divide rarely, if ever, attribute America's
origins to the actions of a Supreme Being." 2 12 Instead, they tend to suppose
that "the American mind has been from the outset pragmatic, optimistic, and
secular. ... 213
This sense in which the competing conceptions have a "constitutional"
status is closely linked to a second sense: proponents of each vision have
207. Cf Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61
STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008) (discussing the significance of"soft law" or "subconstitutional law").
208. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 30 (2004).
209. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 7.
210. HUNTER, supra note 133, at 50.
211. Id. at 109.
212. Id. at 113.
213. Id.
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typically supported their views by invoking foundational documents and
statements from American history--documents and statements that are
"constitutional" or that are "organic," as the Supreme Court once put the
point.214 Thus, supporters of the providentialist view regularly quote the
Declaration of Independence, with its appeal to "Nature and nature's God"
and its bold assertion that men are "endowed by their Creator" with rights.2 "
Other favorite texts include Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom, 216 Presidential proclamations and inaugural addresses by early
luminaries such as Washington and Jefferson,217 and Lincoln's celebrated
Second Inaugural Address.218 Conversely, proponents of the secularist
interpretation point to an array of evidence,219 including the studied
omission by the Framers to include religious language in the Constitution
itself,220 Jefferson's "wall of separation" letter221 and his refusal to declare a
national day of prayer and thanksgiving,222 James Madison's "Detatched
Memoranda,"223 and a statement in the Treaty with Tripoli.224
214. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470 (1892).
215. See, e.g., JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 41 (1987).
216. See supra note 175.
217. For Jefferson's Second Inaugural Address, see supra note 176. Washington's First Inaugural
Address contained these words:
[I]t would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official Act, my fervent
supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the Universe .... In tendering this
homage to the Great Author of every public and private good, I assure myself that it
expresses your sentiments not less than my own; nor those of my fellow-citizens at large,
less than either. No People can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand,
which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of the United States. Every step,
by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation, seems to have
been distinguished by some token of providential agency . . .. These reflections, arising
out of the present crisis, have forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be
suppressed.
George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 157, at 446-47.
218. Lincoln's address, now engraved on the wall of the Lincoln Memorial, was, as one historian
observed, a "theological classic," containing within its twenty-five sentences "fourteen references to
God, many scriptural allusions, and four direct quotations from the Bible." ELTON TRUEBLOOD,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THEOLOGIAN OF AMERICAN ANGUISH 135, 136 (1973).
219. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 116.
220. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 148, at 26-44; JACOBY, supra note 170, at 28.
221. See supra note 171.
222. See supra note 172.
223. This memorandum, believed to have been written between 1817 and 1832 and not discovered
and published until much later, advocates a strict separation of government from religion and
opposes official chaplains and executive declarations of days of fasting and thanksgiving. The
memorandum is reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 157, at 589-93.
224. The Treaty with Tripoli, ratified in 1797, declared that "the Government of the United States
of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion . . . ." Treaty of Peace and
Friendship Between the United States and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli, of Barbary, U.S.-Tripoli,
art. 11, Nov. 4, 1796, reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 157, at 475-76.
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In these ways, the competing conceptions have presented themselves as
"constitutional" in the sense that they are descriptions or interpretations of
commitments that are taken to be fundamental to or "constitutive" of the
American republic. For much of the nation's history, however, the
conceptions have not been "constitutional" in another important sense: they
usually have not been offered or taken as judicially enforceable
interpretations of what the national Constitution itself formally and
bindingly mandates. Thus, when nineteenth-century courts heard cases
challenging prayer and Bible reading in schools, they considered and then
accepted or rejected these claims as matters of state law, not federal
constitutional law.225 Because the decisions did not purport to be enforcing
the United States Constitution, it was possible for one position to prevail in
one place and another to govern in another place.
Similarly, when the nineteenth-century Supreme Court made
pronouncements that today would likely be taken as having a constitutional
character, the Court was not declaring what the Constitution required. In
Vidal v. Girard's Executors,226 for example, the Supreme Court considered
the validity of a will bequeathing property to the city of Philadelphia for the
purpose of establishing a school for "poor male white orphan children" but
prohibiting any "ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect
whatsoever" from administering, teaching, or even being "admitted for any
purpose, or as a visitor, within the premises" of the school.227 Daniel
Webster argued, eloquently and at length, that this prohibition rendered the
will invalid as "antichristian. 228 Though the Supreme Court managed to
sustain the will by construing it to permit the teaching of Christianity by lay
instructors, the Court seemed to accept Webster's essential premise: if the
will had been antichristian, then it would have been invalid.229 Even so, the
Court located the principle protecting Christianity in the law of
Pennsylvania, 230 not in the federal Constitution.
Similarly, when in Holy Trinity Church v. United States the Supreme
Court made its celebrated or notorious declaration that "this is a Christian
nation," 23 1 the Court did not purport to be interpreting the Constitution.
Rather, the Court was relying on a range of laws and "organic utterances"
225. See, e.g., Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127 (1844); see supra note 201.
226. 43 U.S. 127.
227. Id. at 129, 133.
228. Id. at 143-44.
229. Id. at 197-201.
230. Id. at 201 (holding the decision to be based on "the constitution or laws of Pennsylvania" and
"the judicial decisions of its tribunals").
231. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
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(going all the way back to Columbus) to advance what was closer to being a
claim about what might be thought of as the nation's political culture or
sociology for the purpose of discerning Congress' likely or presumed intent
in a particular piece of legislation regulating immigration.232 Indeed, well
into the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
state aid to parochial schools, the issue was considered under the Due-
Process and Republican-Form-of-Government Clauses; it did not seem to
occur to the Court even to raise an Establishment Clause issue.233
To be sure, there were all along citizens who believed that their favored
conceptions should be constitutionalized in a more formal sense. Thus,
some critics of the original Constitution insisted that it ought to have
included some acknowledgment of the Almighty, as the state constitutions
did and as the Articles of Confederation had done.234 This position was
again widely promoted during the Civil War.235 Conversely, other citizens
agitated for a more explicit constitutional affirmation of governmental
secularism. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, consequently,
sustained contrary movements developed in support of constitutional
amendments that would have expressly acknowledged Christianity in the
Constitution or, conversely, would have explicitly affirmed that the
Constitution required governments to be secular (as the constitutions of
other countries sometimes do) 236 . These movements ultimately came to
naught: Americans evidently preferred to leave the Constitution in its
noncommittal or agnostic condition.237 Consequently, at least until the
school prayer decisions, the competing orthodoxies retained a merely quasi-
constitutional status.
E. The Virtues of Quasi-Constitutionalism
This "crazy-quilt," quasi-constitutional condition may leave the
intellectually fastidious feeling queasy. The condition may appear to be
profoundly, and intolerably, "unprincipled." 238 Rodney Smith expresses a
232. See id. at 470-72.
233. See Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 373-374 (1930).
234. For a discussion, see KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 148, at 26-44.
235. See HARRY S. STOUT, UPON THE ALTAR OF THE NATION: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
WAR 273, 373 (2006).
236. For example, the preamble to India's constitution expressly declares that India is a "secular
democratic republic . . . ." INDIA CONST. pmbl., available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29
july08.pdf (last updated July 29, 2008).
237. For a discussion of these movements for a Christian amendment and a secular amendment,
see PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 287-334 (3rd prtg. 2002).
238. The objection to such a "crazy-quilt" community receives perhaps its most sophisticated
articulation in Ronald Dworkin's claim that a legal regime can claim authority only if it reflects a
"coherent set of principles." Conversely, Dworkin thinks a legal regime that adopted a
"checkerboard" approach to issues (and "checkerboard" actually sounds somewhat more orderly and
dignified than "crazy quilt") would be illegitimate. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-79,
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common sentiment when he condemns, as an unacceptable "mishmash," a
situation in which the relation between government and religion can differ
from one time or place to another.239 More recently, but in a similar vein,
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle worry that a tightening of standing requirements
might leave more Establishment Clause adjudication in the hands of state
courts. "[T]he loss of a unifying federal voice in these matters may
eventually subvert the uniformity of federal law," they suggest, adding that
"[w]hatever one's view of the Establishment Clause," the loss of uniformity
"cannot be seen as salutary for either religious freedom or the constitutional
system as a whole."2 40
So, how did such a disorderly condition manage to prevail for more than
a century-and-a-half? Contrary to the judgments of critics like Smith, Lupu,
and Tuttle, an apologist for this approach might have argued that the quasi-
constitutional approach to matters such as the relation between government
and religion had much to recommend it-of both a negative and a more
positive nature.
1. Quasi-Constitutionalismi as the Default Position
The quasi-constitutional approach might have been the best available
alternative by default. That is because neither the providentialist nor the
secularist position could-or can-claim the full qualifications that an
official constitutional orthodoxy ideally ought to have.
In the first place, though both positions are compatible with the original
Constitution and the First Amendment, neither can convincingly claim to be
mandated by the original meaning or the intentions of the enactors. To be
sure, advocates of both views have often attempted to claim an originalist
mandate. But such claims overreach on each side. 24' The simple fact is that
although the Constitution forbids-and was always understood to forbid-
certain types of interactions between government and religion (the
establishment of a national church, for example, or the imposition of
religious tests for national office), it neither endorses any religious position
nor commands that government must be secular in all of its operations.242
188,211-16 (1986).
239. SMITH, supra note 153, at 187, 190.
240. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. and the Future ofEstablishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 166.
241. Cf FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 9 ("Both evangelicals and secularists like to claim that our
constitutional past and tradition support their approach. Both are wrong.").
242. Thus, at the conclusion of a recent exhaustive study not only of the original understanding of
the Establishment Clause but of subsequent interpretations of that understanding, Donald Drakeman
explains that
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And, as noted, efforts to impose some more explicit and committed stance
on the Constitution through amendment have repeatedly been rejected.243
The behavior of early Congresses and Presidents in instituting
legislative chaplains and prayer, authorizing and issuing Thanksgiving
proclamations, and so forth overwhelmingly attests that they did not
understand the Constitution to impose any requirement that government
must be secular. Advocates of the secularist construction typically try to
circumvent such evidence by arguing that the enactors adopted a "principle"
of secular government that they did not fully grasp and hence promptly
proceeded to violate. 244 But what is the warrant for attributing to the
Framers a "principle" that they never explicitly articulated and instead
routinely, openly, and even proudly violated in practice? The argument
works, it seems, only by assuming what is at issue-namely, that the United
States is or should be a politically secular nation-and then by projecting
that conclusion backwards onto recalcitrant framers.245
Neither, however, does the historical evidence convincingly show that
the enactors or the founding generation embraced the providential position
as a constitutional orthodoxy or mandate. Secularists point out, as noted,
that the Framers studiously declined to include in the Constitution even the
standard generic language acknowledging providence, despite demands and
criticism from more pious citizens.246 This deliberate omission surely
counts against an interpretation of the Constitution as affirmatively
embracing a providentialist position (even if the secularists' own favored
inference-that the Constitution, by its silence on the matter, mandated
secular government-seems to be a brazen non sequitur).
it is important to appreciate that [the Establishment Clause] was not the statement of a
principle of secularism, separation, disestablishment, or anything else. It was the answer
to a very specific question: Would the new government countenance a move by the larger
Protestant denominations to join together and form a national church? The answer was
no....
. . . At the time it was adopted, the establishment clause addressed one simple
noncontroversial issue, and the list of those who supported it demonstrates that it cannot
reasonably be seen as encompassing a philosophy about church and state ....
DRAKEMAN,supra note 147, at 330 (2010).
243. See supra note 237.
244. We have already observed Justice Brennan making this familiar argumentative move. See
supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text; see also I DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Original Intent and the
Constitution Today, in RELIGIoUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 594, 595-
99; cf PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, DAVID W. MACHACEK & ERIC MICHAEL MAYER, RELIGION ON TRIAL
85 (2004) ("[T]he United States began as a de facto Protestant nation despite what its Constitution
declares. The nation took a long time to awaken to the constitutional violations that even today
some people cannot recognize.").
245. In this vein, historian Sidney Mead concluded that "those who try to make secularists-in the
classical sense-out of [the nation's founders] are just as wrong [as those who argue for a 'Christian
nation' interpretation]." MEAD, supra note 162, at 21 (footnote omitted).
246. See supra note 234. But see Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past History, 2009
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 46 (arguing that the Constitution did acknowledge deity in the
Attestation and Oaths and Affirmations Clauses).
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A recent exchange between Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul
Stevens serves to illustrate the point. Resisting a secularist interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, Scalia points to the mass of evidence of
ecumenical public religious expression at the founding (and afterwards).247
"With all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face," Scalia asks,
"how can the Court possibly assert that the First Amendment mandates
neutrality between ... religion and nonreligion ... ?",248 In response,
Stevens observes that not all public religious expression has been
249
ecumenical in nature; some has been overtly sectarian. Scalia in turn
rejoins that Stevens's evidence is irrelevant or counterproductive: how can it
strengthen Stevens's case for secularism, he asks, to show that governments
and government officials have sometimes thought it permissible to favor
Christianity or to engage in sectarian expression?250
In reality, it seems, both Justices are right-and wrong. Scalia is
persuasive in claiming that evidence of pervasive public religious expression
from the founding era onwards counts heavily against an interpretation that
holds the Constitution was intended or understood to mandate governmental
secularism. And Stevens's evidence of overtly sectarian public expressions
hardly strengthens the secularist interpretation. But his evidence does
undermine Scalia's apparent view that the Constitution somehow
constitutionalized an ecumenically or generically theistic position. The
upshot of the argument-and the most plausible conclusion-is that the
Constitution (including the First Amendment) simply did not
constitutionalize either ecumenical providentialism or political
secularism. 251
Perhaps more importantly, neither providentialism nor secularism can
plausibly claim to express a strong consensus of Americans' views, past or
present, about how the nation is or should be constituted.252 Once again,
247. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886-89 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Id at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 726-28 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I am at a loss to see how this
[evidence] helps his case, except by providing a cloud of obfuscating smoke.").
251. 1 have argued elsewhere that in the original understanding, the Establishment Clause was a
purely jurisdictional measure, confirming in writing what the Constitution's supporters had said all
along: that religion would remain within the jurisdiction of the states, not the national government.
See Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1843 (2006); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995). This interpretation is wholly
consistent, I believe, with Donald Drakeman's recent conclusion that the Clause was meant merely
to prevent an established church at the national level. See supra note 147.
252. Cf NOLL, supra note 194, at 248 ("The founding era of the United States was intellectually
messy. No essentialist reading of its history-whether Lockean, republican, Enlightenment
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proponents of both positions have often made such claims. Indeed, both
have resorted to the same pattern of argument, which by now is wearisomely
familiar. We might describe this strategy as the "spurious consensus
argument." The initial assertion is that the advocate's preferred position-
ecumenical providentialism or political secularism-reflects a settled
consensus of American opinion. Then, faced with powerful contrary
evidence in the form of dissenters who insist that they do not accept the
ostensible consensus, proponents either ignore the dissenters or seek to
dismiss or marginalize them by insisting that they are being unreasonable or
perversely contrarian.
In the nineteenth century, and often in the twentieth century as well, this
pattern of argument was regularly employed by advocates of
providentialism. Thus, nineteenth-century supporters of "nonsectarian"
public schools declared that everyone could or should be comfortable with a
brief daily reading from the Bible. The Catholics who strenuously protested
were simply being perverse: after all, they believed in the Bible, didn't they?
This stance studiously omitted to notice that to Catholics, a reading from the
King James Bible unaccompanied by explanation or commentary clearly
came across as a distinctly Protestant practice.253
In this respect, Martha Nussbaum castigates the proponents of
nonsectarianism for failing to see that their position alienated citizens who
did not accept the sort of generic Protestantism that the position reflected.
"It's rather extraordinary," Nussbaum remarks, "that people had so little
sense of history that they didn't notice this, or perhaps they simply didn't
care."254  Nussbaum's criticism seems cogent- but also ironic, because
exactly the same comment might be applied to Nussbaum and others who
deploy the same dismissive, marginalizing strategy against the numerous
citizens today who do not share in the currently favored secularist orthodoxy
and who insist that resolutely secular public schools or a secular public order
are contrary to their beliefs and values. 255 Thus, Noah Feldman observes
that "[i]ncreasingly, the symbolism of removing religion from the schools,
courthouses, or the public square is experienced by values evangelicals as
excluding them, no matter how much the legal secularists tell them that is
not the intent." 256
rationalist, or Protestant evangelical-can ever be faithful to the reality that actually took place.").
253. See JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 7-42 (2003).
Noah Feldman points out that "Catholic objections that nonsectarianism did not include them were
met with little more than the naked insistence that it did." FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 85.
254. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 218 (2009).
255. Thus, throughout her book on liberty of conscience, Nussbaum studiously declines to credit,
respect, or even accurately describe the concerns of citizens associated with "the religious right," but
instead repeatedly dismisses them as motivated by "fear and insecurity," "sheer selfishness," and a
"desire to lord it over others." Id. at 8, 28.
256. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 15.
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Such marginalization is conspicuous in the influential political
theorizing of John Rawls, who urged that important political decisions
should be made on the basis of "public reason" grounded in an ostensible
"overlapping consensus" that works (subject to various qualifications that
Rawls introduced from time to time) to screen out direct reliance on
"comprehensive doctrines," including, most obviously, religion.2 57  And
what about the many Americans whose beliefs do not prompt or permit them
to join in this thoroughly secular "overlapping consensus?" Rawls explained
that the "consensus" does not include everyone, but only those whose views
are "reasonable." 25 8  The rest, it seems, are shunted to the political
margins-Rawls compares them to "war and disease" as problems that need
to be "contain[ed]" 259-in the same way that Catholics and, later, secularists
were marginalized in the nineteenth century.
By now it should be apparent that this pattern of argument is futile
(except for rhetorical purposes, when "preaching to the choir") and that the
claims of consensus, whether coming from the providentialist side or the
secularist side, are spurious. The fact is that both ecumenical
providentialism and political secularism are congenial to millions of
Americans and uncongenial to millions of other Americans. Neither view
comes close to capturing a genuine consensus of the citizenry.
2. The Positive Advantages of Quasi-Constitutionalism
But the quasi-constitutional approach might be attractive not just on
negative grounds or as a default position that might be acquiesced in absent
anything better. On the contrary, quasi-constitutionalism offers important
advantages in a large and religiously diverse political community.
In the first place, a quasi-constitutional orthodoxy (as opposed to a
formal and official one) is supple and adaptable. The preceding discussion
has suggested that the political-religious landscape of the country has varied
from time to time and place to place and not according to any uniform
pattern or steady trajectory. Given these variations, any formal, Procrustean
orthodoxy, whether providentialist or secularist, will inevitably fail to fit
well in some geographical or temporal localities. A floating menu of quasi-
constitutional conceptions, by contrast, can better adapt to prevailing
257. See RAWLS, supra note 163, at 58-66.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 64 & n.19 (observing that "there are always many unreasonable views" and that the
fact of doctrines that "reject one or more democratic freedoms" -as Rawls understands them, of
course-"gives us the practical task of containing them-like war and disease-so that they do not
overturn political justice").
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conditions. Thus, in recent years, a few constitutional scholars have argued
for the value of such local adaptability in constitutional law and in Religion-
Clause jurisprudence in particular.260
Beyond its adaptability, however, a quasi-constitutional approach has
another important, though rarely noted, advantage. Because it is subordinate
to the formal Constitution, a quasi-constitutional position allows citizens
who dissent from the (at least temporarily) prevailing but objectionable (to
them) quasi-orthodoxy to look beyond it and to focus their allegiance on a
higher and non-offending authority and symbol. In this vein, I have argued
at length elsewhere that the Constitution is prudently agnostic: it does not
affirm either secularism or religion, atheism or theism. Moreover, the
Constitution's agnosticism figures in an important strategy for securing the
attachment of diversely minded citizens. As constituents of what Will
Herberg aptly described as "pre-eminently a land of minorities," 26 1 they-or
rather we, all of us-will in different times and circumstances likely find
ourselves out of harmony with the expressions and philosophies emanating
from governments. But we can nonetheless remind ourselves that these
expressions and philosophies are not ultimately constitutive of the political
community. Above them in the hierarchy of legal and political authority
stands the Constitution-the agnostic Constitution that steadfastly declines
to align itself with either the providentialist or secularist visions of the
country.262
F. On the Eve of the School Prayer Decisions
The preceding discussion has suggested that throughout most of
American history, competing conceptions or families of conceptions that I
have called ecumenical providentialism and political secularism have vied
with each other for citizens' allegiance and governmental recognition-not
at the level of formal constitutional doctrine, however, but rather as rival
quasi-constitutional interpretations of the American political community.
Moreover, in a pluralistic nation, a quasi-constitutional approach to such
issues, though intellectually untidy, may have distinct political advantages.
This inelegant but practically serviceable situation prevailed on the eve
of the school prayer decisions. The Supreme Court had already decided
Everson v. Board of Education,263 of course. But (and the point is crucial)
260. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006);
Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L.
REv. 1513 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1888-89 (2004).
261. See infra note 433 and accompanying text.
262. These arguments are developed at much greater length in Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic
Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120 (2008).
263. 330 U.S. I (1947).
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Everson had not elevated either of the competing conceptions to official
constitutional status.
To be sure, Everson had extended constitutional nonestablishment to the
states by ruling that the Establishment Clause was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling departed from previous cases and
arguably amounted to an effective repeal of the original meaning of the
Clause, which had been calculated to leave the question of church-state
relations in the state domain.264 Even so, Everson's focus was institutional,
not philosophical or cultural. Everson articulated a variety of ways in which
institutional interference of church in state or state in church would not be
permitted.265 And the decision affirmed and constitutionalized a
longstanding (though much contested) resistance to governmental financial
support for churches or church-sponsored schools.266 What is important for
present purposes, however, is that Everson did not attempt to
constitutionalize any general conception of the relation between government
and religion or religious beliefs. More specifically, the decision nowhere
commanded that government must be secular; indeed, the majority opinion
quoted without apparent embarrassment Jefferson's eloquently theistic
justification for religious freedom: "Almighty God hath created the mind
free . . .. 267
Subsequent Supreme Court cases had followed Everson in this respect.
To be sure, the decisions sometimes referred to government and public
education as "secular." 26 8 Such references are hardly surprising; as noted,
virtually everyone in this country agreed-as Western peoples had agreed
throughout the period of Christendom-that government operated in the
realm of the secular in an encompassing sense, in which "secular" meant "in
and of this world," not "non-religious. 269  The references to "secular"
education in Everson and immediately succeeding cases were casual,
264. This argument is developed in SMITH, supra note 251, at 17-50.
265. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-17.
266. Opposition to financial support for churches was manifest, of course, in the celebrated defeat
of the Assessments Bill in Virginia and the passage of Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom, which Everson effectively incorporated into the First Amendment. See id. at 12-13. The
opposition to funding church-sponsored schools would have been constitutionalized by the so-called
Blaine Amendment after the Civil War. Although that amendment was not enacted, similar
amendments were adopted in many states. See FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 75-87.
267. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13.
268. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 3, 7, 18; McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17
(1948).
269. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
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without evident intent to give the term any definitive or exclusionary
meaning.270
In McCollum v. Board of Education, for example, the Court referred to
public education as "secular," 2 7 1 and a concurring opinion by Justice
Frankfurter emphatically contrasted "secular" with "sectarian" teaching and
praised "[t]his development of the public school as a symbol of our secular
uniity... ."272 Today, this language might easily be read as an effort to
constitutionalize a modem secular conception, and that may well have been
Frankfurter's intent. But at the time, and in the context of an opinion
focusing not on generic and traditional exercises but rather on a program for
providing explicit and sectarian religious instruction on school premises, this
meaning was hardly obvious. After all, Frankfurter gave primary credit for
the position he favored to Horace Mann, nineteenth-century champion of (as
Frankfurter put it) "[t]he non-sectarian or secular public school . . . ."273
Mann's "nonsectarian" program could no doubt be described as "secular" in
the classical sense, and it did indeed oppose "sectarian" religious instruction,
but Mann had also insisted on an ecumenically religious character for public
schooling.274
That the Court was not embracing a secular-as-not-religious
constitutional conception was vividly apparent in Zorach v. Clauson,27
decided five years after Everson. In that decision, the Court reiterated the
prohibition forbidding government to "blend secular and sectarian
education. ... "276 At the same time, the Court saw no apparent
inconsistency between this prohibition and an explicit acknowledgment that
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." 2 77 And the Court enumerated as accepted and acceptable aspects of
the American tradition "[p]rayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the
Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making
Thanksgiving Day a holiday; [and] 'so help me God' in our courtroom
oaths." 278
270. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 3, 7, 18.
271. 333 U.S. at 208-09.
272. Id. at 212, 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
273. Id at 215-17 (emphasis added).
274. Thus, Mann employed the practice of reading the Bible without commentary. He explained
that "our system earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of
religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and, in receiving the Bible, it allows it to do what it is
allowed to do in no other system-to speak for itself" HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION TOGETHER WITH THE TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE BOARD 116-17 (1849), quoted in Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 298.
275. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
276. Id at 314.
277. Id at 313.
278. Id at 312-13.
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Thus, when the plaintiffs in Engel v. Vitale279 filed suit, the country
remained in the condition that had characterized it from the outset-a
condition in which both ecumenical and secularist quasi-constitutional
understandings could jostle and join and could rise or fall as times, places,
and circumstances might dictate. This condition extended to public
education. Thus, approximately one-third to one-half of America's public
schools conducted some sort of regular devotional service or Bible reading.
The proportions varied by region: Bible reading was practiced in over two-
thirds of schools in the East and in over three-quarters of the schools in the
South, but the numbers were drastically lower in the Midwest and West-
less than twenty percent.280 Such local variations were constitutionally
permissible; neither the more devotional nor the more secularist regimes
enjoyed (or were afflicted with) official constitutional status.
The school prayer decisions would quietly but decisively change all that.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS
Considering the school prayer decisions against the backdrop of the
preceding quasi-constitutional, crazy-quilt pattern, we can appreciate how
those decisions were transformative and yet how their transformative
character was largely invisible to those who rendered and supported the
decisions.
A. How the Decisions Transformed Constitutional Doctrine
Engel and Schempp 281 disapproved school prayer, but there was nothing
especially novel or momentous simply in that outcome. As noted, some
state courts had reached a similar conclusion, under state law, almost a
century earlier. 282 Nor was the mere outcome-namely, the declaration that
school prayer was unconstitutional-in itself any major innovation. The
Court might easily have invalidated school prayer on the ground that the
classroom prayer is inherently coercive283 without making any significant
change in constitutional doctrine.
279. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
280. See the figures given in FRANK SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE 297 (1976).
281. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
282. See supra note 201.
283. The Court would later use this rationale in declaring graduation prayer unconstitutional. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The rationale would seem to apply afortiori to classroom
prayer involving younger students.
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Indeed, what gave the Supreme Court's decisions their transformative
significance was not even simply their preference for the secularist
conception of America over its long-time rival. The central and seminal
significance of the decisions, rather, lay in their elevation of that secularist
conception to formal constitutional status (importing it as the baseline for
judging whether a practice met the constitutional demand for "neutrality").
The constitutionalization of the neutrality-as-secularism position meant that
in the future, the secularist conception would dominate not only school
prayer cases, and indeed not only Religion Clause cases, but would come to
govern (albeit erratically, and usually sub silentio) constitutional discourse
generally.
The school prayer cases were not single-handedly responsible for this
change, of course. Like all decisions, they occurred against and were
permitted or elicited by a political and cultural background. Moreover, the
shift to a secularist constitutional conception is discernible in other decisions
as well, including McGowan v. Maryland,2 84 decided the year before Engel.
Nonetheless, the school prayer decisions were especially powerful in
importing and solidifying the new understanding, in part because of three
features that a decision like McGowan lacked.
1. Secularism as the Doctrinal "Test"
First, in Schempp, the Court formulated its position in terms of what it
explicitly described as a two-part, secular-purpose and secular-effects
"test."2 85 Conventional lawyerly wisdom understands that what binds in a
judicial decision is the "holding" (or, sometimes, the ratio decidendi286 );
other statements in a decision, described as the "dicta," are not binding and
can more readily be ignored or distinguished in future cases. To be sure,
efforts to articulate any precise method for distinguishing between "holding"
and "dicta" have proven unavailing. 287 Nonetheless, a court's use of the
term "test" (especially when the test is formulated with multiple and
numbered components, or "prongs") is usually taken as a reliable sign that in
articulating this formulation the court understands itself to be declaring law,
not just talking or persuading. Just as law students' lethargic laptops
284. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In McGowan the Court rejected a challenge to a Sunday-closing law,
but it did so on the assumption that the law served "secular" purposes. The decision declared that
such a law would violate the Establishment Clause if its purpose were "to use the State's coercive
power to aid religion." Id. at 453.
285. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
286. Ratio decidendi is Latin for "the reason for deciding"; it is "the principle or rule of law on
which a court's decision is founded." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (9th ed. 2009).
287. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 55-56 (2004); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 8 (1997) (observing that "what
constitutes the 'holding' of an earlier case is not well defined and can be adjusted to suit the
occasion").
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suddenly go into overdrive as soon as the professor utters something that
sounds like a rule or "doctrine," lawyers and judges pay close attention when
the Supreme Court declares a multi-part "test." The "test" will typically be
cited and will serve to frame the analysis in future briefs and cases.288
By embodying the secular purpose and effect requirements in a "test,"
therefore, the Supreme Court solidified its constitutionalization of the
secularist position. When the Schempp test was later incorporated into the
Lemon test,289 that constitutionalization was ratified and extended. And
indeed, hundreds or thousands of later cases, state and federal, have taken
that "test" as authoritative.
2. The Significance of the Public Schools
The decisions' impact on constitutional law and culture was
strengthened by the fact that the cases involved public schools. As has often
been noted, public schools have an especially central and even mythic place
in American democracy, on both practical and symbolic levels. Noah
Feldman observes that by the mid- 1 800s,
public schools mattered so centrally because those schools, still in
their infancy, were already understood as sites for the creation of
American identity .... This was true as a practical matter, since
compulsory public schooling was the only time in an American's
life when one was subjected, like it or not, to the propaganda of the
state. But the public schools were also centrally important
symbolically, because there the government revealed what values it
intended to support ....
Both the practical and symbolic centrality of the public schools
to the creation of American values has remained consistent through
the rest of American history.290
Justice Brennan emphasized the point in Schempp: "Americans regard the
public schools," he declared, "as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government." 291
288. For a critical discussion of the modem Supreme Court's practice of expounding
constitutional law in the form of "carefully framed doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of
'tests,' 'prongs,' 'requirements,' 'standards,' or 'hurdles,"' see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121-55 (1989).
289. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
290. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 70.
291. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Indeed, scholars have sometimes suggested that public schools are the
American equivalent of an established church; they are "the high church of
the Religion of Democracy," as John Jeffries and James Ryan put it.292
Thus, public schools are a civic institution that Americans look to for the
formation of future citizens, where core democratic conceptions and values
are supposed to be inculcated in the rising generation.2 93 In this way, the
schools link past, present, and future in the democratic venture.294 In
addition, by contrast to state and national governmental institutions and
agencies, public schools are the democratic institution in which many
citizens can directly participate, either as students, parents, teachers, or
simply involved citizens.
Not surprisingly, therefore, public schools have often been viewed as
the crux and the quintessential carrier of American democracy, and
controversies over the content of school programs and curricula have
intensely engaged the arguments and passions of Americans. In a study of
all church-state cases between 1951 and 1971, political scientist Frank
Sorauf reported that "the overwhelming majority of the cases (43 of the 67)
in some way or another involved the elementary and secondary schools,
either public or private religious schools." 295 Sorauf added that "[t]he school
cases ... attract considerably more extensive and intense group activity than
do the others, and they also attract greater numbers of amicus curiae. ... 296
Decisions ruling that the Constitution imposed a secular regime on the
public schools thus carried special significance, both practical and symbolic.
3. The Importance of Prayer
In addition, it was crucially significant that the decisions concerned the
permissibility of prayer. Prayer is the activity in which religious believers
292. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 312. In support of this characterization, they quote Martin
Marty's explanation that democracy "has few temples or churches or synagogues. But it has an
'established church' in the field of public education." Id. at 312 n.175 (quoting MARTIN E. MARTY,
THE NEW SHAPE OF AMERICAN RELIGION 72 (1958)). The distinguished historian of religion Sidney
Mead observed that "[t]he public schools in the United States took over one of the basic
responsibilities that traditionally was always assumed by an established church. In this sense the
public school system of the United States is its established church." DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at
19.
293. As the Court memorably explained in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
294. Cf HUNTER, supra note 133, at 198 (noting "the intrinsic link between public education,
community and national identity, and the future (symbolized by children)").
295. SORAUF, supra note 280, at 6.
296. Id. at 254.
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do not merely assert, explain, defend, or even act upon their faith, but in
which they actually and actively acknowledge and commune with deity (as
they believe).297 Prayer is thus a sort of performative embrace of
providential governance: the person who intones the words of a prayer is
comparable to the person who does not merely wish or intend to marry, but
who actually says "I do." The point can be appreciated from the perspective
of the non-believer; a person without religious faith might nonetheless read
and discuss scripture or theology-atheists are by no means debarred from
participating in biblical hermeneutics or philosophy of religion 298-but the
non-believer will find it difficult to pray to a being who (in his opinion) does
not exist. 299 Consequently, a daily prayer conducted in public schools is an
especially salient affirmation of the providentialist point of view.
To observe this performative dimension of prayer is not to claim
anything about the efficacy of the exercise in instilling genuine piety in
students. Critics question, usually in disdainful tones, the practical value of
school prayer in infusing real religiosity or understanding into students.3*
Ellery Schempp, a plaintiff in the Schempp case, complained that the prayer
in his Pennsylvania school was like "peeing-you just do it; it has no
meaning.,,30 ' The assessment is likely accurate but also in a sense beside the
point. For many students, no doubt, something like the Regents' Prayer was
largely a rote exercise devoid of any genuine spirituality. Even so, the
prayer enlisted students in a daily performative acknowledgment of
providence; presumably it was for just this reason that opponents found the
exercise so unacceptable. In this vein, Francis Roth, a plaintiff in the Engel
case, indicated that she was not opposed to the national motto "In God We
297. Cf ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, MAN'S QUEST FOR GOD 12 (1954) ("Prayer is not thinking.
To the thinker, God is an object; to the man who prays, He is the subject.").
298. A representative book of readings on philosophy of religion thus contains writings by a
number of thinkers known for their anti-religious or skeptical tendencies, such as David Hume, J.L.
Mackie, Richard Dawkins, and Kai Nielsen. See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: SELECTED
READINGS (Michael Peterson et al. eds., 1996).
299. Difficult, but perhaps not impossible. Anthony Kenny, a philosopher and professed agnostic,
maintains that "[bjeing agnostic does not mean that one cannot pray. In itself, prayer to a God about
whose existence one is doubtful is no more irrational than crying out for help in an emergency
without knowing whether there is anyone within earshot." ANTHONY KENNY, WHAT I BELIEVE 64
(2006).
300. Stephen Monsma describes the Regents' Prayer invalidated in Engel as "innocuous (some
would say insipid)." STEPHEN V. MONSMA, POSITIVE NEUTRALITY 74 (1993); cf Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Ironic State of Religious Liberty in America, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1995)
(commenting on "the theologically vacuous nature of most organized public school prayers").
301. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 164.
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Trust." "It's the actual act of praying I object to," she explained, "no matter
how innocuous the prayer was." 302
If school prayer not only reflected but performed the providentialist
view, the elimination of prayer and Bible reading aligned the schools with
the secularist conception. But the change was more than simply the
substitution of one view for another. As noted, school prayer had been
optional, both with schools or school districts and with individual
students.303 A Nassau County school district could elect to use the Regents'
Prayer; a few miles away, New York City schools had opted against the
prayer.30 Accordingly, no one could suppose that the prayer exercise or the
providentialist conception it reflected was constitutionally approved or
compelled. By contrast, the elimination of school prayer in Engel and
Schempp displaced the providentialist conception by the secularist one. But
more importantly, the new orthodoxy was now being imposed as the
position and mandate of the United States Constitution. Public secularism
had become the official, constitutive orthodoxy.
B. Why the Significance of the School Prayer Decisions Went Largely
Unnoticed (by Their Supporters)
In constitutionalizing political secularism, the school prayer decisions
effected a major change not only in Establishment Clause doctrine, but in the
nation's official self-understanding. The outrage with which many
Americans reacted to the decisions suggests that these citizens perceived the
significance of this change.305 But that significance seems to have been less
apparent to the Justices who rendered the decisions, and to many of the
decisions' supporters (Justice Douglas and the ACLU being notable
exceptions).30 ' And their failure to appreciate what had been wrought is
understandable.
For one thing, as discussed, virtually all Americans had long assumed
that government was supposed to be "secular" in some sense.307 And for
many Americans in the 1960s, "secular" had simply come to mean "not
religious" (as it typically does today). In this respect, the term has
undergone dramatic changes. Real effort is required to recover older and
other senses of the term: not many Justices, scholars, or citizens will have
occasion or cause to make that effort.30 s Hence, it was easy for the Justices
302. Id. at 137.
303. See supra notes 24-25.
304. DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 70.
305. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
306. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
308. On rare occasions, even the Supreme Court may use the term in a different and more
classical sense, but when it does, many readers (and dissenting justices) may find the usage almost
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and like-minded citizens, in declaring that government must be "secular" in
the more common contemporary sense of the term, to believe that they were
simply reiterating an understanding that had prevailed all along.
In addition, as discussed, the secularist conception had long been one of
the leading quasi-constitutional interpretations of America-one that in the
twentieth century had become dominant in the more elite classes to which
Supreme Court Justices (and law professors) typically belong.3 09 But the
distinction between a "quasi-constitutional" and a fully "constitutional"
understanding, though crucially important, is also subtle and easy to
overlook. Those who adhered to the secularist view had long regarded it as
constitutive of the political community, and hence as "constitutional," at
least in the lower case sense of the term. From the perspective of those who
held the secularist view, in reading that view into the Constitution the Court
was simply articulating what had long or always been true-even if this
truth had somehow been rampantly disregarded or violated throughout much
of American history. In effect, the Court had simply taken a familiar view-
that the American constitution mandates secular government-and
capitalized the "C" in Constitution.
We can also appreciate why many of those who supported the Court's
decisions did not anticipate any very wide-ranging implications. Of course,
it is hard to know just how much of what later ensued was anticipated or
hoped for; as noted, Justice Douglas fondly foresaw a sweeping elimination
of public religious expression, and Justice Brennan's later opinions in cases
like Marsh v. Chambers at least raise the suspicion that he may have had
intimations of more than he acknowledged in Schempp.310 Still, many
supporters denied that the decisions would have any far-reaching
consequences, 3 1 and these denials may well have been sincere. After all,
the various incidents and practices of what is sometimes called "civil
religion"3 12 had persisted throughout the country's history despite the
country's commitment to political secularism (as people with this view
incomprehensible. For further discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment "Under God"?
The Nonsectarian Principle, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
309. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at 136 (reporting Professor Philip Kurland's view that
Engel was "important but narrow in breadth"). A New Republic essay found the critical public
reaction "remarkable," adding that "[m]ost authoritative observers believe that the practical
consequences of Engel v. Vitale in our school system will be negligible." Engel v. Vitale, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, July 9, 1962, at 3, reprinted in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE CASES
THAT DEFINE THE DEBATE OVER CHURCH AND STATE, 142, 142-43 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993).
312. For a seminal discussion, see ROBERT N. BELLAH, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND
BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONALIST WORLD 168 (1970).
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supposed). So why should the explicit acknowledgment of that long-
standing position threaten such practices and expressions?
This mindset would be vividly manifest a generation later in Justice
O'Connor's evident inability to see any inconsistency between a
constitutional doctrine prohibiting governmental endorsement of religion
and a traditional municipal Christmas crdche. O'Connor initially proposed
the "no endorsement" doctrine, we may recall, precisely because she thought
(albeit to the dismay of baffled critics) 13 that the doctrine provided a
convincing justification for permitting the crdche.314
In short, it is entirely understandable that many supporters of the school
prayer decisions did not see them as especially radical or momentous. To
these people, the outraged reaction of many other Americans naturally
seemed excessive, even hysterical.3 15 And indeed, as with many
transformative developments-the Fourteenth Amendment is a leading
example-the full implications of the decisions were not immediately
manifest. Law often takes time, as the saying goes, to "work itself pure."
Decades later, however, we can attempt to appreciate how the decisions and
the secularist conception that they embraced altered the landscape not only
of Religion Clause jurisprudence but of constitutional discourse generally.
V. TRANSFORMATIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER
DECISIONS
Almost half-a-century has passed since the school prayer decisions were
announced. Two generations of citizens have been raised and formed under
the secular pedagogical regime that the decisions ordained. So, what have
been the results?
Most obviously, the decisions themselves have survived. Despite their
enduring unpopularity with the general public, they have not been overruled,
and repeated efforts to undo them through constitutional amendment have
failed.1 The example they set, specifically with respect to prayer in the
public schools, has been faithfully followed: thus, the Supreme Court has
313. Mark Tushnet noted, with apparent understatement, that O'Connor's conclusion that the
cr6che did not endorse Christianity "came as a surprise to most Jews." Mark Tushnet, The
Constitution ofReligion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 712 n.52 (1986).
314. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
315. Philip Kurland commented acerbically that "[t]o read into this decision the implications that
have been read into it is to expound a parade of imaginary horrors." DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at
136.
316. Cf I DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions
and Historic Changes, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 399, 423
("There have been innumerable proposals to amend the Constitution to permit school-sponsored
prayer, none of which has passed Congress, and endless efforts to restore school-sponsored prayer
while disguising and denying government sponsorship.").
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invalidated a moment of silence law, 1 a graduation prayer,' 8 and a custom
of praying before high school football games. 319 Douglas Laycock observes
that "the Supreme Court ... has not wavered from those [school prayer]
decisions in 40 years."320
But the consequences of the decisions have hardly been limited to
prayer. When we consider large historical movements, of course, chains of
cause and effect are hard to corroborate with certainty. It is difficult to know
whether particular decisions and events that appear to have led to later
occurrences were genuinely causative or merely reflective of less visible
historical currents that might have produced the later developments in any
case. Such questions are inherently speculative and subject to competing
interpretations; they provide the murky matter from which historians make
their living. Acknowledging such uncertainties, we can nonetheless
appreciate the likely influence of the school prayer decisions-and, more
specifically, of the regime of political secularism that they elevated to
constitutional status-in a variety of important legal and cultural
developments.
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Beyond their direct influence on later school prayer cases, the school
prayer decisions, by constitutionalizing the conflation of neutrality with
secularism, diverted Establishment Clause jurisprudence away from the path
that Everson seemed to have set for it and that Justice Douglas
contemplated. We can describe this redirection in terms of the oft-noted
displacement of "no aid separationism" by a commitment to neutrality-as-
secularism. 321
1. Subverting Everson
The dominant theme of Everson had been separationism, and
separationism had been interpreted to mean that government could not aid
religion. To be sure, Everson also foreshadowed future developments, and
its own subversion, by ruling that the particular form of aid considered in the
case-a subsidy supporting transportation of students to and from schools,
317. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
318. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
319. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
320. 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Vouching Towards Bethlehem, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS
AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 390, 392-93.
321. See infra note 343.
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including religious schools-was permissible as a manifestation of state
"neutrality" toward religion.3 22 "Neutrality" was nonetheless presented as a
secondary theme in Everson: most of the rhetoric in the majority opinion and
even more so in the dissenting opinions emphasized "separation" and "no
aid."3 2 3 The school prayer decisions, by contrast, reoriented the doctrine by
making neutrality the primary theme and by effectively equating neutrality
with governmental secularism.
The significance of this reorientation was not readily apparent, in part
because modern judges, advocates, and scholars have often supposed that
"separation" and "secularism" are equivalent or mutually entailing ideas.324
But the supposition is unsound. Separation neither depends on nor entails
secularism. As a historical matter, from the Papal Revolution of the
eleventh century through Roger Williams and up through Jefferson and
Madison, a commitment to church-state separation was most often defended
on religious grounds as a sort of theological commitment.2 Indeed, such
theological rationales for separation are still sometimes offered.326
Conversely, a commitment to secularism need not entail any prohibition on
aid to religion so long as religion is serving some secular function (as in the
so-called "charitable choice" or "faith-based initiatives" supported by recent
administrations, both Republican and Democratic). Thus, by innocently
substituting secularism for separationism at the center of Establishment
doctrine, the Supreme Court foreshadowed a significantly altered direction
for Establishment jurisprudence.327
At least one astute contemporary observer noticed the significance of
this shift. Pointing out the inconsistency between Everson's no-aid
separationism and the neutrality mandated by Schempp, Michigan law
professor Paul Kauper perceived an implicit rejection of the Everson
theme.328 "The emphasis on neutrality," he observed, "indicates that the no-
aid-to-religion test, as a principle of construction, has lost its significance. It
is not a viable test." 329
322. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
323. Id. at 15-16.
324. See, e.g., KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 148, at 206; JoHN M. SWOMLEY, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND THE SECULAR STATE 17 (1987) (interpreting "[t]he constitutional doctrine of
separation of church and state" to mean that "[t]he Constitution ... provides for a wholly secular
government").
325. See SMITH,supra note 178, at 112-27.
326. See HART, supra note 164, at 13.
327. Of the Justices involved in the cases, Justice Douglas seems to have perceived this shift most
clearly. As noted, Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion in Engel; in it he repented of voting
with the majority in Everson, and he emphasized money and the "no aid" theme as the central
commitment of the Establishment Clause. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
328. Kauper, supra note 71, at 14, 27.
329. Id. at 38.
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Kauper was unusual, however, in grasping the significance of this shift.
Several years after the school prayer decisions, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Court announced a new, three-part Establishment Clause test that in its
wording reflected and ratified the shift in emphasis from "no aid"
separationism to secularism.33o Once again, though, neither the Court nor its
observers seemed initially to assimilate this alteration.
The primary emphasis on governmental secularism was plainly
expressed in Lemon's first and second requirements, taken verbatim from
Schempp, that a challenged law must have a secular purpose and a principal
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."' And the "neither
advances nor inhibits" formulation reflected Schempp's commitment to
neutrality. 332 By contrast, the separationist commitment from Everson was
relegated to Lemon's third requirement, which prohibited government from
becoming excessively entangled with religion, and was stated in murky
terms: indeed, the Court itself proceeded to demonstrate that it was wholly
unsure what this prohibition meant. Thus, the Lemon formulation
followed Schempp in explicitly giving secular neutrality pride of place over
separation. And yet early applications of the test failed to reflect this
change; the decisions continued to resonate primarily with Everson's more
separationist orientation.
Thus, during the decade and a half following Lemon, the Court
invalidated a variety of programs for giving aid to religious schools. 3 34 With
the benefit of hindsight, it seems that the decisions invalidating aid programs
were more the lingering manifestation of a residual commitment to
Everson's "no aid" separationism than the product a logical application of
the Lemon test in its explicit terms. In almost every case, the Court found
that the challenged aid satisfied the first Lemon requirement: governments
were acting with the entirely legitimate and secular purpose of promoting
education. The difficulties most often arose, the Court thought, under the
second, "effects" prong.35 At least in its explicit formulation, though, the
330. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
331. Id. at 612.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 613-15.
334. The Court upheld some forms of aid, however, and the hairline or perhaps illusory
distinctions developed in these cases were a frequent subject of ridicule. Characteristic of such
criticism was Leonard Levy's complaint that the decisions turned on "distinctions that would glaze
the minds of medieval scholastics." LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 128 (1986).
335. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382, 394 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S.
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second prong prohibits only laws or programs that have a '"principal or
primary effect" of advancing religion: advancement of religion as a
secondary or "incidental" effect is not prohibited.36 But if the purpose of an
aid program is the legitimate and secular purpose of promoting education, as
the Court repeatedly concluded it was, then why was it not plausible to
suppose that the primary effect of the program would correspond to its
permissible purpose (even if religion also received some benefit as a
secondary effect)? In the school aid cases, the Court never satisfactorily
answered or even squarely addressed this question. Its invalidating
decisions, in effect, treated the second prong basically as equivalent to
Everson's "no aid" prohibition.
Indeed, sometimes the effects prong proved insufficient, so that a
decision to invalidate aid was forced to invoke the more obviously
separationist "no excessive entanglement" prong.3" Even so, this residual
separationist motif was frail, because in fact the Court never seemed quite
sure just what this "entanglement" prong meant, or what its function was. 38
At times the Court seemed to equate "entanglement" with political
divisiveness; 339 but in other cases the Court expressed reservations about this
construction.340 In one case, the third prong was formally collapsed into the
second, "secular effects" requirement,34 1 though it was later extracted again
(at least in the lower courts).342
Overall, it seems fair to say that the third prong has been more
vacillating and less influential than the first two prongs. This relative
importance reflects a substantial and often noted shift in which the residual
separationist commitment began to wane, displaced by the "secular
neutrality" logic first announced in the school prayer cases and later adopted
in the Lemon test.343 As a consequence, after 1985 the Supreme Court began
793.
336. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added).
337. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.
338. Cf I LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 305 ("But 'entanglement' has been a vague term with
changeable meaning. Sometimes it seems to mean contact, or the opposite of separation.
Sometimes it seems to mean church regulation. Sometimes it seems to mean government
surveillance of churches.")
339. E.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24.
340. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984), for example, the Court worried that a
litigant might, "by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, ... create the appearance of divisiveness
and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement."
341. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-35.
342. See, e.g., Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010);
Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 100 (3d Cir. 2009).
343. For scholarly treatments of the decline of separationism, see Thomas B. Colby, A
Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of
the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (2006); Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions
and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (2004); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of
Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230 (1994); see also Angela C. Carmella, Everson and Its
Progeny: Separation and Nondiscrimination in Tension, in EVERSON REVISITED: RELIGION,
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to uphold aid to religious schools in case after case, repeatedly ruling that so
long as religious schools were included in a neutral and secular program for
aiding education, constitutional demands were satisfied.3 " Douglas
Laycock overstates the situation only slightly: "Federal constitutional
restrictions on funding religious institutions have collapsed." 345 Indeed, in
several cases the Court went further, holding that neutrality meant that
governments were constitutionally required to treat religious recipients as
eligible for assistance available to comparable secular institutions or
programs.346
To be sure, dissenting opinions (and concurring opinions by Justice
O'Connor) often attempted to preserve the "no aid separationist" theme left
over from Everson.347  But this theme could gain little traction in a
constitutional framework centrally devoted to neutrality, understood as
governmental secularism, rather than to separation or "no aid" as
independent constitutional commitments.
2. The Emergence of the "No Endorsement" Doctrine
The relaxation of "no aid separationism," however, did not mean that
Establishment doctrine had lost its bite. Instead, its principal force came to
be directed against a different set of practices-namely, governmental
endorsements of religious ideas or traditions-that have been endemic to
American political life and that the Justices in the Everson period seemingly
had not regarded as problematic. As noted, Everson had quoted without
apparent embarrassment the declaration in Jefferson's Virginia Statute that
"Almighty God hath created the mind free. ... And it was after all the
Supreme Court itself, speaking through Justice Douglas, that had declared in
1952 that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being"349-surely (despite Douglas's later apologetic
EDUCATION, AND LAW AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 6, at 103.
344. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
345. 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 126, 127.
346. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v.
Cent. Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
347. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 841
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
348. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947).
349. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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disclaimer 350) an endorsement of religion. But such expressions are hard to
square with the assumption that government is constitutionally required to
be secular in the sense of "not religious." In the years following the school
prayer decisions and the Lemon test, therefore, governmental religious
expression increasingly came to seem suspect.
Critics of public religious expressions argued, initially without much
success, that such expressions violated the secular purpose and effect
requirements."' This argument gained force when in 1984 Justice
O'Connor proposed that the Establishment Clause be formally reconceived
in terms of a prohibition on governmental actions or messages which
endorse or disapprove of religion.352 Despite difficulties in implementation,
O'Connor's proposal resonated strongly with the "secular neutrality" logic
of Schempp and Lemon. Unsurprisingly, therefore, within a few years the
"no endorsement" test had been accepted by a majority of Justices. 13  Since
that acceptance, controversies involving alleged endorsements of religion-
in the Pledge of Allegiance, Ten Commandments monuments, and crosses
on federal property-seem to have pushed aside the older financial aid cases
to occupy center stage in the public gaze and the Supreme Court's docket.35 4
Rigorously implemented, the "no endorsement" doctrine would seem to
condemn a great deal of expression that has been practiced and valued in the
American political tradition,3 55 including the national motto ("In God We
Trust"), the official use of prayer in legislative sessions and Presidential
inaugurations-even, ironically, Jefferson's celebrated Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom35 6 (which Everson had read into the first amendment as
the basis for modem Establishment jurisprudence).5 In reality, neither the
Court nor most supporters of the secularist conception have wanted to push
secularism to these extremes. Often, therefore, they have tried to save
entrenched and revered expressions by interpreting them as having primarily
historical or cultural significance. But the interpretations often exhibit a
strained quality. Thus, Justice O'Connor's explanation of how the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance do not send any religious message
350. See supra note 46.
351. The argument was made but rejected in cases such as Citizens Concerned for Separation of
Church and State v. Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981), and Aronow v. United States, 432
F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970) (rejecting constitutional challenge to national motto "In God We Trust").
352. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
353. See Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
354. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004).
355. For a forceful argument for this conclusion, see Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2083 (1996).
356. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
357. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947).
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left readers incredulous. * And Douglas Laycock pronounces the
contention that the Ten Commandments monuments are erected and
maintained for their secular significance "undoubtedly a lie."359
B. Constitutional Law Outside the Establishment Clause
The influence of the school prayer decisions, and of the conception of
secularism that they constitutionalized, is most conspicuous in later
Establishment Clause cases, especially in cases concerned with school
prayer. But the decisions' influence360 outside the Establishment Clause
area, though less overt, may be even more important.
We might start by noticing a linkage that is casually alluded to in Noah
Feldman's book Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem-And
What We Should Do About It.361 As its title suggests, the book is primarily
about the relations between religion, politics, and government in this
country; its legal focus is on the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
Early on in the book, however, Feldman notices a connection between his
subject and some controversies that are not officially Establishment Clause
matters: "same-sex marriage,... stem-cell research, abortion, euthanasia,
and the death penalty."362 Later in the book, Feldman reaffirms that
connection.363 Nor is he alone in perceiving such a connection. For
example, Susan Jacoby observes that "the split over school prayer was a
precursor of the bitter division over the 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion
decision." " Douglas Laycock describes a "polarized debate that extends to
a wide range of religious liberty issues and also to social issues such as
358. Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf I
LAYCOCK, supra note 345, at 211 (observing that "[t]his rationale is unconvincing both to serious
nonbelievers and to serious believers"). Steven Shiffrin observes, "I am sure that a pledge
identifying the United States as subject to divine authority is asserting the existence and authority of
the divine." Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REv. 9, 70-71 (2004). And he adds that "pretending [that this and similar expressions] are not
religious is simply insulting." Id. at 71.
359. 1 LAYCOCK, supra note 316, at 425.
360. By "influence" I mean "influence," not something like "sole or determinative cause." Andy
Koppelman has suggested to me, in response to claims made in this section, that some of the
developments described here were products of other movements such as the so-called Sexual
Revolution. He is surely right. But that observation in no way negates the possibility of influence
from other factors as well.
361. See FELDMAN, supra note 128.
362. Id. at 6.
363. Id at 195-98, 224-25.
364. JACOBY, supra note 170, at 324.
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pornography, abortion, feminism, and gay rights."365
But how are nonestablishment, and the school prayer cases in particular,
relevant to these other controversies? Disputes over abortion, euthanasia,
and same-sex marriage present constitutional issues, to be sure, but not
Establishment Clause issues-not on their face, at least. These disputes
have been addressed by the courts mainly under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.366 How might
these controversies be affected by decisions in a wholly different area of
constitutional law?
Once we appreciate the significance of the school prayer decisions in
constitutionalizing a secular conception of American government, the
connection becomes apparent. Through much of the nation's history, to be
sure, religion pervasively and openly influenced political opinion and debate
on divisive issues from abolition to temperance to women's rights to the
movement for racial equality.367  The Supreme Court did not regard such
influence as impermissible; on the contrary, the Court itself appealed to
religious values and premises from time to time with no apparent sense of
impropriety.368 As political secularism became entrenched as constitutional
orthodoxy, however, these appeals to religious values or premises as a basis
for political decisions came to seem problematic, perhaps forbidden.
Thus, recent decades have seen a wide-ranging debate, on the levels
both of political philosophy and constitutional law, about the permissibility
of religious belief as a basis for political decisions.369 Perhaps surprisingly,
the debate did not reach full vigor until about the mid-1980s. But
preliminary sparring occurred earlier. One of the first major books dealing
with the question in a systematic way was Kent Greenawalt's Religious
Convictions and Political Choice, published in 1988.370 In his preface,
however, Greenawalt explained how the question of the permissibility of
religion in political decision-making was first raised for him when as editor-
365. 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 651, 673. See also PAUL
HORwITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (2011) (observing that
religious freedom controversies are skirmishes in a larger cultural struggle).
366. See infra notes 387-92 and accompanying text.
367. See generally Michael E. Smith, Religious Activism: The Historical Record, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1087 (1986).
368. See supra notes 231, 349 and accompanying text.
369. The literature is vast, but some particularly incisive or influential contributions include
CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); ROBERT AUDI,
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS
(1999); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); cf I LAYCOCK,
supra note 365, at 684-85 (observing that scholars who believe "religious arguments are excluded,
limited, or at least somehow suspect, in the political process" include Bruce Ackerman, Robert Audi,
Christoper Eisgruber, Kent Greenawalt, Abner Greene, William Marshall, Michael Perry, Lawrence
Solum, and Kathleen Sullivan).
370. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
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in-chief of the Columbia Law Review he closely read Louis Henkin's article
challenging obscenity regulation as an imposition of religion. 37' Henkin's
article was published, as it happens, in 1963, a year after Engel (which
Henkin cited) and in the same year as Schempp,373 and it tentatively
proposed what Henkin himself described as a "novel" doctrine-namely,
that legal regulations based on moral prohibitions that were grounded in
religion and that had not evolved into a more secular form violated the First
Amendment.374
Academic contributions to the debate over "religion in the public
square" by scholars like Greenawalt, Robert Audi, Michael Perry, and
otherS375 are often searching, intricate, sometimes ponderous. Judicial
pronouncements are typically much more casual, perhaps evasive- and
understandably so. That is because on the practical level, there seems to be
no very satisfactory resolution of the issue.
In the abstract, it would be easy enough to conclude that if government
is required to be secular, then political decisions simply cannot be based on
religious rationales; decisions that are so based would be constitutionally
invalid. And, again in the abstract, such a conclusion might find a cozy
doctrinal home in the Lemon test's "secular legislative purpose"
requirement. But though straightforward enough in theory, this conclusion
also provokes powerful practical objections. For one thing, given the
country's religious history and composition, it seems likely that numerous
laws have in fact been based to a significant extent on religious beliefs.376
Consequently, a flat prohibition on laws based on religious rationales might
threaten numerous necessary laws. A constitutional interpretation that might
have the effect of invalidating, say, murder laws is plainly not viable. 77 In
371. Id. at viii. Greenawalt acknowledged that "some of [the article's] possible broader
implications for secularizing political decisions escaped me at the time." Id.
372. Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391
(1963).
373. The article did not cite Schempp, presumably because the article was written before the
Schempp decision was announced, but it did cite Engel (along with other Establishment Clause
decisions). Id at 408 n.52, 412 n.67.
374. Id. at 412. Henkin added: "What is important is that the underlying questions be recognized
and considered, ... in the light of new facts, new insights, new views of morality, new readings of
the Constitution." Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
375. See supra note 369.
376. Cf Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35
EMORY L.J. 777, 788-89 (1986) ("Even two generations ago, if one had asked Americans where our
Constitution-or indeed, our whole concept of law-came from, on what it was ultimately based,
the overwhelming majority would have said, 'the Ten Commandments,' or 'the Bible,' or perhaps
'the law of God."').
377. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Chaos
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addition, such a prohibition might burden or even effectively disenfranchise
large numbers of citizens who cannot or will not bracket their religious
convictions when voting or debating public issues." Moreover, nearly
everyone favors some laws-civil rights legislation, for instance-that were
passed in part on the strength of openly religious justifications and with the
support of religious leaders like Martin Luther King Jr.
Theorists sometimes try to avoid these embarrassments by maintaining
that legislation in fact enacted on the basis of religious reasons is
nonetheless permissible so long as an adequate secular rationale can be
supplied for such laws; Rawls calls this qualification "the proviso."3 79 But
this position is difficult to implement in practice. How strong, and how
widely held, must an alternative secular rationale be to save a law in fact
enacted with religious support and on the strength of religious reasons?
Surely it cannot be enough that one single citizen sincerely supports a
measure based on a non-religious rationale: in a large and diverse nation,
such a requirement would be negligible. But who is to say whether a secular
rationale that might be given, or that at least a few citizens actually believe,
is sufficient to justify a law that likely would not have been passed without
the support of religious citizens acting on their religious beliefs? These are
hard questions, and so in practice, the courts have tended to ignore them or
deflect them with the observation (as unhelpful as it is unobjectionable) that
a law is not rendered invalid merely because its purpose or rationale
"happens to coincide" with some citizens' religious beliefs.38 o Whether in a
given case religious beliefs actually supplied or merely "happen[ed] to
coincide" with a law's rationale is a question the Court most often studiously
avoids.
Within this doctrinal black box, however, something like the Rawlsian
proviso may well be at work, in a rough and intuitive way. Many laws that
as a historical matter may have been adopted on the basis of religious
belief-laws against theft and murder, for example-seem easy enough to
justify on secular grounds because it is hard to imagine any society, religious
or not, that would not prohibit citizens from robbing or murdering each
other. By contrast, in the popular mind, and perhaps even more so in the
would ensue if every such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause. For example, the
State could not criminalize murder for fear that it would thereby promote the Biblical command
against killing.").
378. Cf Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments
Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 639, 656 (arguing that
"[t]he principle of secular rationale degrades religious persons from the status as equal citizens").
379. The proviso holds that reasons based on reasonable comprehensive doctrines can be offered
in political discourse regarding important public decisions so long as "in due course public reasons,
given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the
comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support." RAWLS, supra note 163, at li-lii.
380. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 598, 599 n.5 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319
(1980).
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academic and judicial mind, there are positions on controversial public
issues that are understood (or perhaps misunderstood) to be primarily based
on religious belief, and for which non-religious justifications seem weak or
contrived. Opposition to artificial contraception, for example, is widely
perceived to be derived from religious belief or religious authority.38'
Abortion is more complicated, perhaps, because the moral status of the fetus
can be a difficult issue for the religious and non-religious alike; nonetheless,
opposition to abortion is widely associated with religious groups, especially
the Roman Catholic Church.3 82 Opposition to euthanasia in principle (as
opposed to more pragmatic opposition based on fears of undue pressure or
slippery slopes) is another position commonly associated with religious
groups and religious belief.383  Condemnation of consensual same-sex
intimacy is another such instance.384
In a nation of 300 million people, to be sure, it is possible to find non-
religious citizens who sincerely oppose contraception, euthanasia,
homosexual intimacy, and especially abortion. However, it is commonly
supposed that such individuals tend to be unusual; by-and-large, such
opposition comes from religion, or from religious constituencies. I am not
asserting that the supposition is definitely correct, but only that it is widely
held. 385 On this view of things, and on the premise that government is
constitutionally confined to the domain of the secular, laws prohibiting
contraception, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexual sodomy seem deeply
problematic.3 86 So it should not be surprising that such laws have suffered
from hard treatment in the courts in the years since the "political secularism"
position was constitutionalized.
381. See JACOBY, supra note 170, at 274-75, 353.
382. See id. at 342-47.
383. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 195 (1994) ("The Roman Catholic church is the
sternest, most vigilant, and no doubt most effective opponent of euthanasia, as it is of abortion.").
384. In Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009), the Iowa Supreme Court declared
that "[w]hile unexpressed, religious sentiment most likely motivates many, if not most, opponents of
same-sex civil marriage . . . ." See also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 152-53 (2010) (asserting that "[t]he argument that not only could but almost certainly
does account-indeed, the only argument, other than an implausible secular argument, that could
account-for the judgment of state lawmakers that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral is not
secular but religious: Such conduct ... is 'in direct opposition to God's truth as He has revealed it in
the Scriptures."').
385. See ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION 257 (2003) (describing
the common perception that "religious believers" are "hell-bent on prohibiting abortion, throwing
Darwin out of public schools, denouncing homosexuals, and imposing their prayers on others").
386. In this vein, Edward Rubin argues that laws restricting abortion or same-sex marriage and
laws prescribing abstinence-based sex education are unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause. Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 4 (2005).
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Two years after Schempp, the Court struck down Connecticut's rarely
enforced law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives.8 Less than a decade
later, the Court invalidated laws prohibiting abortion." Later, after an
initial refusal, the Court struck down a law prohibiting homosexual
sodomy. 389 The Court also indicated that states cannot prohibit persons from
refusing medical assistance necessary to preserve their lives, thus
recognizing one strand of what is sometimes popularly called a "right to
die."390 And though the Court rejected challenges to laws prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide,3 ' most of the Justices ruled largely on factual or
prudential grounds while indicating their willingness to reconsider and
perhaps reach the opposite conclusion upon a proper factual showing.392
These decisions were not on their face based on the Establishment
Clause, much less on the school prayer decisions; officially, at least, they
were Due Process and Equal Protection cases. Nonetheless, the "political
secularism" conception loomed large in the background. Thus, the results in
the cases were not dictated by anything in the particular language or history
of the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. Instead, the Court extracted
from those clauses a requirement of legislative rationality--one that applied
with heightened force to laws impinging on particularly important human
interests. Such laws, the Court said, had to be justified by legitimate and
important state interests.39 3 The interests asserted by the states in support of
the challenged laws were found to be insufficient394 (or, in the assisted
suicide cases, provisionally sufficient on the factual record that had been
developed).3 95
At least as important in this calculus as the interests actually presented
by the states were the rationales that were not presented. Many citizens and
legislators may have supported restrictions on abortion, or euthanasia, or
same-sex intimacy, in part on the basis of reasons that would have sounded
in religion. But these religious rationales were either not noticed by the
Court or else were peremptorily dismissed as inadmissible. Justice Stevens
387. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
388. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. i13 (1973).
389. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
390. Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
391. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
392. For a review and analysis of the various opinions, see Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Can
Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End ofLife and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 1453, 1459-66 (2008).
393. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79; Roe, 410 U.S. at 148-52.
394. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (finding no legitimate interests to support Texas sodomy
law); Roe, 410 U.S. at 148-52 (assessing state interests, which the Court found sufficient to justify
some restrictions on abortion but not a complete prohibition).
395. Although the Court listed a number of interests supporting a prohibition on assisted suicide,
various Justices indicated skepticism about some of these interests. See Kamisar, supra note 392.
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believed that religious rationales were the basis for restrictions on abortion
or euthanasia, and that some of the secular-sounding rationales presented by
the states were simply camouflage for "theological" commitments.3 6  On
that understanding Stevens voted to invalidate such laws.397
In this way, the political secularism constitutionalized in Engel and
Schempp likely influenced the arguments and deliberations in cases on
matters such as abortion, euthanasia, and sodomy, even when the lawyers
and the Court made no direct reference to religion or to the Establishment
Clause. Secularism had become axiomatic; it therefore required no explicit
discussion or defense, but was nonetheless (or perhaps afortiori) a powerful
influence on constitutional decision-making.
The same phenomenon is operative in cases dealing with other issues
including, most recently, same-sex marriage. Defenders of challenged legal
restrictions understand that in attempting to support such restrictions they
must avoid invoking anything that sounds like a religious justification.398
Consequently, the judicial discussions of objections and supporting
rationales can have a rarefied quality: the debate about the pros and cons of,
say, restrictions on same-sex marriage that occurs in a judicial opinion can
seem denatured or truncated in comparison to the more full-blooded
exchange that can occur in more unofficial settings.
In sum, despite the absence of explicit reliance on the face of the
judicial opinions, observers like Noah Feldman and Susan Jacoby are likely
correct in connecting the controversies over issues such as abortion,
euthanasia, and same-sex marriage to the understandings of the Religion
Clauses-understandings announced and established in the school prayer
decisions.
C. Divided Discourse
As we have just noted, the secularist conception influences legal
discourse, even on matters not overtly presenting Establishment Clause
issues. More generally, the conception influences public discourse that is
"constitutional" in a broad sense. This influence has contributed to two sorts
of constitutional divides.
396. Cruzan v. Dir., 497 U.S. 261, 347 (1990).
397. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 347, 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
398. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904-06 (Iowa 2009) (finding that religious
opposition to same-sex marriage cannot count as a legitimate state interest).
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1. The Historical Divide
First, the constitutionalization of political secularism has in a
complicated but important sense distanced those who accept the secular
conception from a major part of the nation's past, including some of the
more revered expressions and manifestations that have helped to constitute
the American political tradition. The plain fact is that, historically, religion
has figured prominently and unapologetically in much political and legal
discourse. Political officials, including presidents and judges, have cited
scripture and invoked Providence in their official explanations and
justifications for their actions and decisions. 399  Leading jurists such as
Chancellor Kent and Justice Story declared without embarrassment that
Christianity was part of the common law. 400 To be sure, as we have already
seen, not all Americans and not all political figures embraced the
providentialist conception; some, such as Jefferson, resisted it (or at least
some aspects of it) from the beginning. Nonetheless, the conception was
clearly and sometimes eloquently manifest in some of the most important
and revered-and "constitutive"-expressions of the American creed and
spirit: Jefferson's Virginia bill, the Declaration of Independence, and
Lincoln's Second Inaugural.40 1
The elevation of public secularism to constitutional status leaves these
revered expressions in an awkward and ambiguous position. Such
expressions have long been taken as forming-as constituting-the
American political tradition and community. Yet they also appear to be in
open violation of the conception of that community as secular. How then to
regard them? Adherents of the secular conception can attempt to overlook
such expressions, 402 or to criticize or dismiss them, 403 or to translate them
into secular terms, thereby explaining away their religious significance. 404
The powerful providentialist language of the Declaration of Independence
399. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
400. See Banner, supra note 173, at 43.
401. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
402. For an instance, see infra notes 411-15 and accompanying text.
403. This is a common modem response to the "Christian nation" declarations of the Holy Trinity
Church case. Anita Krishnakumar explains that "the Christian-nation portion of the Holy Trinity
opinion generally has been dismissed as a nineteenth-century embarrassment beyond which we as a
nation have grown." Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The
Unique National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053, 1058-59 (2009).
404. Justice O'Connor's explanation of how the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is
a case in point. See supra note 358. In a more rigorous and scholarly vein, Michael Zuckert
acknowledges the religious language in the Declaration of Independence but emphasizes that "[t]he
Declaration . . . depends on an appeal to the God known by reason in and through nature," and he
infers that the Declaration's assertions "point toward a secular society open to the rational as such;
they point toward a cosmopolitan, not a closed or sectarian, society." Michael P. Zuckert, Natural
Rights and Protestant Politics, in PROTESTANTISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 21, 33, 26
(Thomas S. Engeman & Michael P. Zuckert eds., 2004).
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can still be recalled and perhaps even celebrated for its literary and historical
value (much in the way that the Bible can still be read in the public schools
for literary or historical purposes). And the conclusions drawn from such
religious affirmations-conclusions favoring rights and human equality-
can of course be accepted. What the secularist conception seemingly
renders problematic are statements by public officials, speaking as public
officials, that whole-heartedly affirm the Declaration's religious claims as
true.
But it was precisely as spirited affirmations of what Americans took to
be true that such expressions served to inspire and constitute the new
political community. 405 And it is just that sort of earnest affirmation- one in
which present-day citizens would actually join with their predecessors rather
than patting them on the head for having somehow gotten to noble
conclusions by dubious means-that the secularist conception renders
problematic.406 The conception thus has the effect of causing its adherents
to affirm much of the American past not in "bad faith," exactly, and not in
full "good faith" either, but rather in a sort of awkward suspension of
faith.407
Two small manifestations of this awkwardness can be chosen from
among many to illustrate the embarrassment. In a recent book on
Establishment Clause issues, Kent Greenawalt acknowledges that
"assertions about a beneficent God were prevalent at our country's founding,
are contained in the Declaration of Independence, and remain in many state
constitutions." 408 Nonetheless, Greenawalt declares that such assertions by
government would be impermissible today.409 Greenawalt does not explain
exactly why what was once common and acceptable is now constitutionally
forbidden; an explanation presumably would include references to the
405. See WEBB, supra note 159, at 35-38; MICHAEL NOVAK, ON Two WINGS 8-24 (2002).
406. John Rawls tentatively suggests two reasons why Lincoln's Second Inaugural, which Rawls
aptly describes as offering a "prophetic (Old Testament) interpretation of the Civil War as God's
punishment for the sin of slavery," was permissible. RAWLS, supra note 163, at 254. But Rawls's
first reason-that the speech had "no implications bearing on constitutional essentials or matters of
basic justice"-seems starkly implausible. Id Slavery? The reconstitution of the Republic?
Rawls's second reason-that Lincoln's basic message "could surely be supported firmly by the
values of public reason"-even if plausible, suggests that the speech was permissible only because
similar points could have been made without the profound and pervasive theological speech. Id.
407. For a more detailed discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Justice Douglas, Justice O'Connor, and
George Orwell: Does the Constitution Compel Us to Disown Our Past? (San Diego Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 06-17, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
=728663 (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
408. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS
65 (2008).
409. Id
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nation's expanded religious pluralism and perhaps to the Supreme Court's
evolving interpretations of the First Amendment.4 10 Whatever the
explanation, the gulf separating us from our political predecessors is starkly
apparent in Greenawalt's judgments.
A second subtle but intriguing manifestation of the constitutional divide
occurs in a majority opinion written by Justice David Souter invalidating a
display of a Ten Commandments plaque that had been posted in courthouses
in Kentucky. The plaques were part of a collection of documents (including
a section of the Magna Carta, the Star-Spangled Banner, the Declaration of
Independence, and other historic documents) that had been displayed under
the heading of "Foundations of American Law and Government." Based in
part on the evolving history of the displays, which had originally featured
only the Ten Commandments plaques and had been supplemented upon
advice of counsel in response to the legal challenge, Souter and his
colleagues discerned no legitimate secular purpose.4 11
In Souter's lengthy and wide-ranging opinion, one palpably scornful
passage criticized the counties' "odd," "baffling," and "perplexing" selection
of documents for the Foundations exhibit.4 12  Why these particular
documents? Souter asked. Why the Magna Carta? Why the national anthem
but not the Fourteenth Amendment? In this vein, Souter found it
"perplexing" that the counties could suggest an influence of the Ten
Commandments, which were "sanctioned as divine imperatives," when the
Declaration of Independence, also included in the exhibit, explicitly "holds
that the authority of government to enforce the law derives 'from the consent
of the governed."' 413 Evidently these ideas-divine imperative and consent
of the governed-struck Souter as incompatible.
In reality, what is remarkable is Souter's cultivated incapacity to grasp
what either the counties or the Declaration of Independence itself sought to
convey. Whether a belief in Providence as an ultimate source of law and
government can be satisfactorily reconciled with a commitment to popular
sovereignty is no doubt a debatable question. Tocqueville noted that the
joinder of such beliefs was pervasive in American thought: to the Europeans
who doubted the possibility, Tocqueville's recommendation was that they
visit America and see for themselves.4 14 But whether or not these beliefs are
ultimately compatible, what seems indisputable is that the Declaration of
410. Greenawalt elsewhere suggests such factors as the reason why school prayer is unacceptable
today, even though the Framers were not opposed to public prayer. GREENAWALT, supra note 7, at
42-44.
411. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
412. Id. at 872.
413. Id. at 872-73.
414. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 161, at 392-93. Mark Noll explains how the American merger
of religion with republican notion was an exceptional achievement, surprising to most Europeans.
MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005).
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Independence itself explicitly linked human rights and the consensual basis
of political legitimacy to the "Creator" 415 : governments, based on consent,
are instituted to protect the "rights" with which men are "endowed by their
Creator." It was precisely this tradition of harmonizing providentialism and
popular sovereignty that the counties were attempting to present by
displaying the Declaration, the Decalogue, and other documents as
ingredients of the "Foundations of American Law and Government."
David Souter, by contrast, peremptorily brushed aside this longstanding
and distinctive American tradition as "perplexing." He sarcastically
depicted the Kentuckians-who, like the Declaration of Independence,
attempted to conjoin providential and democratic premises-as either
disingenuous or obtuse. But the depiction might with better justification be
turned around. In effect, it seems that Souter could see only the closing
words of the Declaration's portentous passage, which assert the consensual
basis of government, but he somehow was unable to read or remember the
first part of the passage attributing the rights-that government exists to
protect-to the "Creator." Whatever the explanation, Souter's performance
stands as a striking example of how the secularist conception forces its
adherents to re-render American history-in this particular case, effectively
editing the Declaration more than two centuries after its publication by
striking out its explicitly providentialist premise.
2. The Cultural Divide
Of course, Greenawalt and Souter were not making merely abstract or
academic statements about what is and is not proper; they were criticizing-
and in Souter's case, officially invalidating-expressions and practices that
many of their fellow citizens continue to favor even today. This conflict
reflects another sense in which the constitutionalization of political
secularism has created a constitutional divide: the divide is not only
chronological but also cultural or sociological.
By embracing the secularist conception and rejecting the providentialist
conception of America, Engel and Schempp imposed a view generally
accepted in elite culture but widely rejected in more popular culture. 16
415. GEORGE FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION 102 (2001):
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." Behind those
created equal stands a Creator-the source as well of our basic human rights... . This is
the basis for the American people's claiming that no government may rule them without
their consent. The end of the Philadelphia Declaration resonates with another invocation
of a higher power: "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we
mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."
416. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also HUNTER, supra note 133, at 63--64 ("In
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Thus John Jeffries and James Ryan observed that "the controversy over
school prayer revealed a huge gap between the cultural elite and the rest of
America." 4 17 The cultural divide was evidenced by the fact that the school
prayer decisions were generally supported not only by secularists but also by
Jewish and Protestant leaderS418-though not, it seems, by most rank-and-
file religious Americans-and by elite secular conservatives. Even the
respected and generally conservative constitutional scholar, Philip Kurland,
described opponents of the school prayer decisions as "religious zealots" and
lumped them together with "racists" and John Birch Society extremists. 419
In one respect there is nothing new in this situation. From the
beginning, Americans have been divided among each other, and often within
themselves, about whether the providentialist or secularist conception better
expresses the nature of the U.S. political community. The sometimes
cordial, sometimes combative conversation between those conceptions has
been a source of debate and self-examination that has driven important
developments in American law and politics. As we have seen, however, in
the period since Engel and Schempp, that conversation has been transformed
in one crucial respect: the secularist conception has officially been declared
to be the constitutional orthodoxy-binding on local, state, and national
governments.
This transformation has altered the character of the debate. For one
thing, at least when issues are discussed in a judicial forum (as most heated
controversies eventually are), proponents of the providential view are forced
either to talk the language of secularism or else be ruled out of court. This
constraint gives the debate a strained and artificial quality. Critics often
suspect the proponents of providentialist measures of being disingenuous-
general, however, the progressive alliances tend to draw popular support from among the highly
educated, professionally committed, upper middle classes, while the orthodox alliances tend to draw
from the lower middle and working classes. The association is anything but perfect, yet it generally
holds.. . .").
417. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 325; see also I LAYCOCK, supra note 365, at 679
(observing that "nonbelievers are disproportionately in elite positions, where they have
disproportionate influence on public discourse").
418. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 4, at 325-26.
419. Id. In any large-scale cultural conflict, of course, the lines of division are often murky.
Some Americans have no doubt accepted the holdings of the school-prayer decisions but have failed
to perceive, or have resisted, the decisions' broader secularist implications. As those implications
become visible, these citizens sometimes draw back. Justice O'Connor is a conspicuous example:
she proposed the doctrine prohibiting governmental endorsement of religion in the spirit of Engel
and Schempp but then offered strained rationalizations for the conclusion that the Pawtucket
Christmas creche and the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance did not send religious
messages. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. Kent Greenawalt is unconvinced by
O'Connor's rationalizations; but he wonders whether the Pledge case is one of those rare instances
in which judicial dissimulation might be warranted to leave "under God" in the Pledge.
GREENAWALT, supra note 408, at 95-102. By contrast, Martha Nussbaum would like to strike out
the words "under God," but she would leave "In God We Trust" alone. NUSSBAUM, supra note 254,
at 308-16.
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as Justice Souter implied Kentucky officials were420 -or of concealing their
religious motivations. 42 1 But if these citizens are less than forthright, their
reticence occurs under duress, because it is only by adopting a secularist
vocabulary that these citizens are able to participate in the legal
conversation.
As a result, believers in the providential conception often feel
beleaguered and alienated.422 How can it be, they wonder, that the
Constitution somehow forbids officials and citizens today-when acting in
their public capacity-to advance and act upon the same openly religious
rationales that are so evident on the face of the celebrated writings and
enactments of Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln? This dynamic of suspicion,
resentment, and bewilderment is pervasively manifest in the "escalating
series of provocations and legal claims from both sides" 42 3 that are often
called, in an increasingly apt description, the "culture wars."424
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IRONIES OF THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS
The significance of the school prayer decisions is not that they
invalidated school prayer or even that they acted on a secularist conception
of American government. The majority of public schools probably did not
conduct prayer exercises anyway, and some state courts had ruled against
school prayer almost a century earlier. Moreover, a secularist interpretation
of America has been present in one form or another from the Republic's
beginnings. The crucial, or perhaps fateful, achievement of the school
prayer decisions is that they formally constitutionalized this interpretation.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the decisions "established" political
secularism as the nation's constitutional orthodoxy.
This development was attended with ironies-perhaps more apparent
now than at the time. It is often and plausibly said that by foreswearing any
established religion, the United States has managed to avoid the sort of
destructive political conflicts that have so often accompanied established
religion elsewhere.425 If one religion is to be established as the officially
420. See supra notes 411-13 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, When is a Cross a Cross?, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross/?emc=etal; see also I
LAYCOCK, supra note 316, at 425, 440.
422. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
423. 1 LAYCOCK, supra note 316, at 423.
424. 1 LAYCOCK, supra note 365, at 672-89.
425. See DIERENFIELD, supra note 7, at II ("In short, the Founding Fathers created the world's
first secular government as the best way to minimize the religious tensions that had perpetually
plagued Europe.").
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preferred faith, then devotees of the various faiths will fight for that honor-
and, perhaps more urgently, will fight not to be among the losers.426 The
Wars of Religion in early modem Europe gave bloody testimony of that
propensity. Conversely, if the government forbears from designating any
religion as the official or preferred religion, then the various faiths can
flourish or flounder in accordance with their respective merits and energies.
That was the hope of the proponents of disestablishment, in any case, and
with hindsight most observers might agree that their experiment in
nonestablishment has for the most part succeeded admirably. 427 Religious
pluralism has flourished; 4 28 political community has not collapsed.
By constitutionalizing one of the major competing visions of America,
however, and, thus, effectively establishing political secularism as an official
national orthodoxy, the Supreme Court ignored this lesson and risked
instigating just this kind of destructive dynamic. The current state of the
"culture wars" suggests that this risk was, and is, more than speculative.
To be sure, the Court's intention was not to exacerbate conflict-quite
the contrary. A principal attraction of the school prayer decisions was, and
is, that they attempted to relieve the sense of exclusion or alienation felt by
American citizens who did not believe in prayer, or at least in collective
public prayer. 42 9  Literature celebrating the decisions often describes, in
poignant terms reminiscent of old martyrologies, the suffering and exclusion
inflicted on students who did not want to participate in the prayers. 430  At
least in some circumstances that suffering was surely very real. A major
purpose of the decisions was to eliminate this exclusion and alienation. And
this purpose has persisted. Thus, the main professed rationale for the ban on
governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion-a prohibition directly
derived from the political secularist conception-has been to prevent any
citizen from feeling like an "outsider" in the political community.431
426. See 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Religious Liberty as Liberty, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS
AND HISTORY, supra note 5, at 54, 70 ("If the government is allowed to take sides, the two sides will
fight to control the government, and the government will disapprove of, discriminate against, or
suppress the losers.").
427. Thus, in the 1830s, Tocqueville observed that "[i]n the United States there is no religious
animosity, because all religion is respected, and no sect is predominant." 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 161, at 157.
428. See 1 LAYCOCK, supra note 17, at 646 ("It has long been a common observation that religion
has thrived in America without an establishment, and declined in Western Europe with an
establishment.").
429. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 35, at 163 (arguing for ban on school prayer because
such prayer tells non-Christians that they "lack the status of full membership" in the community).
430. See ALLEY, supra note 7. See also FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND
DISCRIMINATION 206 (1999) ("1 fear for children like those involved in [school prayer
controversies]. I fear for the victims because of the pain they will endure at the hands of their
tormentors.... I can see in my mind's eye a school child in turmoil.").
431. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In a large and diverse democracy, however, minorities-and hence
"outsiders"-are inevitable. Some citizens will surely feel like disfavored
minorities, and indeed it appears that nearly all citizens often feel like
embattled minorities.432 Even citizens with minority or idiosyncratic views
are assured the rights to believe and speak and vote as they wish, of course.
Still, at least in a cultural or sociological sense "outsiders" are probably
inevitable in a pluralistic society. Courts cannot eradicate that reality. But
they can ratify and entrench the "insider/outsider" division-by selecting
one among the competing interpretations of the nation and elevating it to
official constitutional orthodoxy, thereby relegating the competing
conception and its adherents to heretical status.
That is what the Court did in the school prayer cases. Millions of
Americans have evidently subscribed to the providentialist conception of the
country. Millions almost surely still do subscribe to it. These citizens may
or may not constitute a "minority"-it is hard to tell, for both empirical and
definitional reasons 433-but there is little question that many of these
citizens now regard themselves as outsiders. Noah Feldman observes that
"[t]he constitutional decisions marginalizing or banning religion from public
places have managed to alienate millions of people who are also sincerely
committed to an inclusive American project." 434  The often impassioned
struggle to preserve the vestiges of that providentialist conception-the
religious expressions conveyed in such things as historical crosses or the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance-is almost inexplicable to
some. What difference do these small, almost meaningless gestures and
symbols really make? 435  But the passions are understandable as
manifestations of the apprehensiveness and resentment felt by people who,
as Feldman observes, have often come to view themselves as strangers in
their own land.
432. See I LAYCOCK, supra note 365, at 688 (observing that "each group perceives itself as a
mistreated minority"); HERBERG, supra note 30, at 231.
Since each of the three [religious] communities recognizes itself as fitting into a tripartite
scheme, each feels itself to be a minority, even the Protestants who in actual fact
constitute a large majority of the American people. In this sense, as in so many others,
America is pre-eminently a land of minorities.
Id.
433. For a discussion of some of the complexities, see generally Smith, supra note 182.
434. FELDMAN, supra note 128, at 15.
435. Richard Schragger argues that concern about governmental religious expression "distracts
away from more significant Establishment Clause concerns." Schragger, supra note 260, at 1880.
"Government-sponsored religious messages are literally symbolic acts, and while such acts may
have effects on the distribution of social power, they should not be considered more significant than
government actions that favor religious institutions with concrete financial or regulatory power." Id
1019
To be sure, the opponents of such symbols often express a similar sense
of alienation. 436  To an atheist like Michael Newdow, the persistence of
official religious expressions such as the national motto "In God We Trust"
understandably provokes such a reaction.437 But there is an important
difference. Adherents to the providentialist view are alienated by the
establishment of political secularism as an official constitutional orthodoxy:
they sense that their understanding of what America essentially is has been
officially declared to be heretical and inadmissible. Conversely, those (like
Newdow) who are alienated by governmental religious expressions are
distressed by what they view as a failure to live up to the secularist
orthodoxy-an orthodoxy that they embrace and that they believe (with the
support of Supreme Court teachings since Engel and Schempp) the
Constitution embraces. America is supposed to be a secular nation, they
insist, but in practice it continues to maintain a "de facto establishment,"438
as Mark DeWolfe Howe described it. It is with respect to that de facto but
officially illicit establishment that these citizens feel oppressed.
In short, one constituency is alienated by the official, or de jure, secular
orthodoxy; another is aggrieved by what it perceives as an ongoing illicit,
but de facto establishment of religion. It is hard to say which kind of
alienation is more severe or widespread-the alienation felt by citizens
whose providentialist conception is officially disapproved, or the exclusion
felt by citizens who embrace the official secularist conception but believe
that the nation fails to live up to that commitment. In a complicated way,
both sorts of alienation are the legacy of the subtle but powerful
constitutional transformation effected by the school prayer decisions.
436. For a collection of "horror stories," as he calls them, recounting the persecution suffered by
opponents of school prayer and related practices and offering virtual hagiographies of a number of
such opponents, see ALLEY, supra note 7.
437. See Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
use of national motto on coins). Newdow once demonstrated this point to me in a vivid way over
lunch, pointing out that he could not even pay the tip without being reminded (if he happened to look
at the coins or bills) that the political community insisted on proclaiming a belief ("In God We
Trust") antithetical to his own.
438. HOwE, supra note 12, at I1.
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